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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEDERAL
RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE
AND UNION CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
AND EXPENDITURES
Marlene Arnold Nicholson f
For many years legislators in the United States have been
concerned about the role played by corporations and unions in
the political process. As early as 1894, Elihu Root urged the
enactment of legislation restricting corporate contributions. He
argued that such legislation would prevent
the great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate
funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the legislature
...

to vote for their protection and the advancement of their

interests as against those of the public.
It strikes ... at a constantly growing evil in our political
affairs, which has ... done more to shake the confidence of the

plain people of small means in our political institutions, than
any other practice which has ever obtained since the foundation
of our government.'

In 1907, Congress prohibited corporations from contributing to
federal candidates. 2 In 1947, it extended this restriction on cont Professor of Law, DePaul University. A.B. 1961, J.D. 1968, University of California,
Los Angeles. I wish to express appreciation to my colleague Jeffrey M. Shaman for his
helpful comments on a draft of this article and to Nancy McCluskey Barrett and Karen
Shields for their research assistance.
E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT & CITIZENSHIP 143-44 (1916).
Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (repealed by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, § 318, 43 Stat. 1074). The current version of the prohibition against corporate contributions to political candidates is found at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(1976) (codifying the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No.
92-225, tit. III, § 321, 90 Stat. 490 (1976)):
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any
political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which
presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or
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tributions to unions and added a prohibition against expenditures
on behalf of candidates. 3 These corporate and union restrictions
were recodified as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. 4 Most states today also prohibit or in some way restrict
corporate contributions to candidates for state offices, and several
states similarly restrict unions. 5 Although the Supreme Court has
had the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the federal
restrictions, it has avoided doing so by narrowly interpreting
them.6 Several recent Supreme Court cases involving analogous
questions, however, cast serious doubt upon the constitutionality
of the statute.
a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in
connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to
select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political
committee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive any contribution
prohibited by this section, or any officer or any director of any corporation or
any national bank or any officer of any labor organization to consent to any
contribution of expenditure by the corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the case may be, prohibited by this section.
3 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120b, § 304, 61 Stat.
136, 159 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)). The present restriction states that "[it
is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation ... or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [federal] election." 2 U.S.C. §
441b(a) (1976). The statute does permit "the establishment, administration, and solicitation
of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes." Id. §
441b(b)(2)(C). See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
A "labor organization" is defined as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b)(1) (1976). Throughout this Article, the terms "union" or "labor union"
are used as synonyms for labor organizations covered under the Act.
Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); see notes 2-3 supra.
See generally AMERICAN LAW DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH

SERVICE,

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW (1977).

6 See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (statute does not prohibit expenditures from separate segregated account funded by voluntary contributions);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 1061 (1948) (statute does not prevent internal union communications).
In United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Court reversed ajudgment that had
dismissed an indictment against the union under the predecessor statute of the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971. In that case, the Court refused to "anticipate [the] constitutional questions," stating:
[O]nly an adjudication on the merits can provide the concrete factual setting
that sharpens the deliberative process especially demanded for constitutional decision. ... [B]y remanding the case for trial it may well be that the Court will
not be called upon to pass on the questions now raised.
Id. at 591-92. Allegations that the Court indicated might "not survive the test of proof"
concerned the voluntariness of the contributions by union members, whether the audience
included only persons affiliated with the union, whether the activity included "active electioneering," and whether there was an "intent to affect the results." Id. at 592. Justice
Douglas, who was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black, would have
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In Buckley v. Valeo, 7 decided in 1976, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act8 -the congressional response to
Watergate. Plaintiffs claimed that the limitations upon contributions to and expenditures for federal candidates violated their
constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and association. The
defendants asserted that limitations upon the amounts of contributions and expenditures should not be subjected to first amendinvalidated the statute as an overbroad attempt to protect the views of dissenting union
members by silencing the majority.
7 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263. The 1974 amendments provided for contribution limitations of $1,000 for individuals and groups, 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1976)), and $5,000 for multicandidate committees. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (Supp.
IV 1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976)); see 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(3)
(1980). A multicandidate political committee is a "committee which has been registered
under section 433 of this title for a period of not less than 6 months, which has received
contributions from more than 50 persons, and ... has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(4) (1976). Independent expenditures on behalf
of candidates were limited to $1,000. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed
1976). A $25,000 annual limitation" on an individual's aggregate contributions for a single
election was also included in the legislation. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1974) (recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1976)).
Amounts that candidates could expend from personal or family funds were limited to
$50,000 for presidential candidates, $35,000 for senatorial candidates, and $25,000 for
House candidates. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). Overall presidential campaign expenditures were limited to $10,000,000 in the primaries and
$20,000,000 in the general election. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1974) (recodified in 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b) (1976)). Limitations on expenditures in Senate elections were
based upon the voting-age population of the state, with minimum amounts for states with
small populations. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(c)(1)(C)-(D) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). Candidates for the House were limited to expenditures of $70,000 in both the primary and
general election, with the Senate ceilings applying to states with only one representative. 18
U.S.C. §§ 608(c)(1)(C)-(E) (Supp. IV 1974) (reiealed 1976).
Public subsidies for presidential candidates in the primaries were provided on the basis
of matching grants. I.R.C. §§ 9033(b)(3)-(4), 9034(a). In the general election, "major" parties were entitled to approximately $20,000,000 each. See 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1) (Supp. IV
1974). "Minor" parties (defined as those polling at least 5% in the last presidential election)
were entitled to a smaller amount based upon the ratio of their votes to the average of the
votes obtained by the major party candidates. See I.R.C. §§ 9002(7), 9004(a)(2)(B). The
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 also provided for extensive disclosure of contributions and expenditures. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-437b (Supp. IV 1974) (modified
1976). In 1980, approxirnately $29,400,000 has been allocated for each major party candidate. 7 CAMPAIGN Paac. REP., July 7, 1980, at 1-2.
The Buckley Court upheld the disclosure requirements, the subsidy provisions and the
limitations upon contributions. It invalidated, however, all of the expenditure limitations.
See 424 U.S. 1, 26-29, 48-54, 62-108 (1976). See generally Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The
Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REv.
323; Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 852 (1976). Congress reenacted the limitations on personal, family and overall
campaign expenditures after Buckley but limited them to cover presidential candidates accepting public subsidies. See I.R.C. § 9004(d).
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ment strict scrutiny because the giving or spending of money was
not "pure speech." A majority of the justices rejected that assertion; they equated money with speech, purporting to apply strict
scrutiny to the limitations.9 The governmental interest in equalizing political influence in the electoral process had been asserted in
previous cases as a rationale supporting both the bans upon corporate and union political spending 1 ° and the limitations placed
upon contributions -and expenditures by individuals and other
groups."t
That rationale, however, was rejected in Buckley as a
basis upon which to uphold the limitations in the 1974 amendments. 12 Preventing the "reality and appearance" of corruption
and undue influence was the only rationale accepted as an appropriate governmental interest; the Court upheld contribution
limitations as necessary to attain that goal. 13 The. Court concluded, however, that independent expenditures on behalf of
candidates, unlike contributions, did not create sufficient danger
of corruption to justify limitation.1 4 The Court may make a similar distinction in a case challenging the corporate and union restrictions by upholding contribution restrictions and invalidating
those upon independent expenditures. Thus, although their contributions may remain restricted, corporations and unions, like
other groups and individuals, would be entitled to spend unlimited sums to express support for or opposition to a federal candidate. t 5
First National Bank v. Bellotti,' 6 decided in 1978, casts further
doubt upon the constitutionality of the federal restrictions on corporate and union campaign spending. In a five-to-four decision,
9 424 U.S. at 16-17. For a criticism of this approach, see Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
10 These limitations were intended to prevent the disproportionate impact upon the
electorate that results from huge corporate and union contributions. See United States v.
CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 134, 142-43 (1947) (concurring opinion, Rutledge, J.). See also United
States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-83 (1956).
1 See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (upholding the limitations);
See also Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 815 (1974).
12 424 U.S. at 48-49. See text accompanying notes 208-11 infra.
13 Id. at 25-29. See text accompanying notes 186-88 infra. The Court used the terms
"undue influence" and "corruption" interchangeably but never defined them.
14 Id. at 44-48. See text accompanying notes 193-95 infra.
's The limitations that apply to individuals and groups other than corporations and
unions, see note 8 supra, define contribution as including expenditures coordinated with the
campaign. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(7)(B)(ii) (1976). Presumably, such expenditures can be constitutionally limited due to the increased danger of corruption arising from the act of coordination.
16 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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the Court held that the Massachusetts ban on corporate contributions and expenditures supporting or opposing referenda questions "not materially affecting" the corporation violated the first
amendment.1 7 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, did not
accept the argument that the corporate identity of the speaker
should prevent application of the strict scrutiny standard to the
restrictions.1 8 The majority also held that the equalization of
political influence was not an appropriate governmental purpose
for this statute, 19 thus demonstrating that not even the corporate
identity of the speaker could convert this rationale into a compelling government interest. Finally, the Court implied in dicta that
protecting the political views of minority shareholders was not an
important government interest, 20 thus casting doubt upon another
rationale for upholding corporate campaign finance restrictions.
In 1977, the Court, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,21 recognized a constitutional right protecting the political views of dissenting public employees who were compelled to contribute fees
to a union. Based upon the holding in Abood, the Court could
sustain the restrictions on union campaign contributions and expenditures. Thus, the possibility exists that the Court may invalidate corporate restrictions but uphold those applied to unions,
thereby upsetting the balance struck by Congress between these
two politically powerful groups.
One recent case has created another obstacle for upholding
the federal restrictions. In ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. Public Service
Commission,2 2 decided in June of 1980, the Court went further
than it did in Bellotti by protecting corporate expression from
restrictions that were not complete bans on speech. Although the
New York Public Service Commission's regulation prevented
435 U.S. at 776. The Massachusetts statute further provided:
No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978). In Bellotti appellants challenging
the restriction wanted to spend corporate funds to oppose a referendum authorizing a
graduated personal income tax.
"s 435 U.S. at 786.
19 Id. at 789-92. See text accompanying notes 212-22 infra.
20 435 U.S. at 794 n.34. See text accompanying notes 253-56 infra.
21 431 U.S. 209 (1977). See text accompanying notes 237-45 infra.
The Abood Court held that public employees who were required to pay agency shop
fees to a union to keep their jobs had a constitutional right to a rebate of funds spent by
the union for political purposes. An agency fee is a service charge paid by nonunion members equivalent to dues paid by union members.
22 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980).
'7
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utilities from discussing "controversial issues of public policy" with
inserts placed in billing envelopes, they remained free to discuss
these issues in any other manner. The federal restrictions upon
corporate and union contributions and expenditures similarly do
not ban speech completely but allow political expression through
corporate and union committees that collect funds voluntarily
provided by shareholders, employees and members. 2 3 The holding in Consolidated makes it less likely that the federal restrictions
will be upheld because of their incomplete nature. In both Bellotti
and Consolidated, the Court stressed that because the restrictions in
question involved the subject matter of expression, strict scrutiny
analysis was necessary.24 Because the federal restrictions also are
based on the subject matter of the corporate and union expression, the statute probably will be subjected to the very difficult
obstacle of first amendment strict scrutiny review.
A constitutional challenge could also be based on first
amendment overbreadth because the governmental interests allegedly served could be achieved by narrower means.2 5 An equal
protection challenge based upon the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the statutory burden is also likely.2
Although
the statute may not be overinclusive for achieving the government's purposes, the statute may be invalidated because of its underinclusive burden on speakers and subject matter. Carey v.
Brown,'2 7 decided on the same day as Consolidated, and Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 2 8 support this thesis. In those cases
the Court invalidated bans on picketing that excluded some forms
of labor picketing.
Not all indicators, however, point to invalidating the federal
restrictions on corporate and union political spending. In Bellotti
the Court stated that "our consideration of a corporation's right to
speak on issues of general public interest implies no comparable
23 See text accompanying notes 93-96 infra.
24 See Consolidated, 100 S. Ct. at 2331; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85.
2- See Redish, Reflections on Federal Regulation of Corporate Political Activity, 21 J. PUB. L.
339, 356-57 (1972); Comment, The Constitutionalityof the FederalBan on Corporate and Union
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 148, 161-65 (1974). Comment,
supra note 8, at 157-59.
Another issue, not discussed in this Article, is whether the federal restrictions are
unconstitutionally vague. See Redish, supra, at 342, 345-46.
2' The equal protection requirement applicable to the federal government is implicit in
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954).
21 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980).
28 408 U.S. 92 (1971).
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right in the quite different context of participation in a political
campaign for election to public office. ' 29 The Bellotti opinion
suggests that Congress might be able to show that independent
expenditures by corporations in campaigns for public office pose
a serious danger of corruption. 3 Because the Court in Buckley
rejected the corruption rationale in the context of limitations on
independent expenditures, the Court clearly implied that corporate political spending is more corrupting than similar activity by
individuals and other organizations. Furthermore, despite frequent assertions to the contrary, 3 I a majority of the justices in Bel-

29

435 U.S. at 788 n.26. One court has relied on the dicta in this footnote to reject a

challenge to the federal restrictions. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinsten, 462 F.
Supp. 243, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); text accompanying notes 224-25 infra. The Fifth Circuit,
on the other hand, recently held that the issue of the constitutionality of the federal restrictions must be submitted to the appellate court en banc. In Federal Election Comm'n v.
Lance, 617 F.2d 365 (1980), Bert Lance, former director of the Office of Management and
Budget, resisted a Commission subpoena by challenging the constitutionality of the restrictions on corporate and union campaign financing, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976). Lance relied on
a 1974 amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a)
(1976), that provides for expedited appeals of constitutional issues under the Act.
Two cases invalidating state limitations on contributions in referendum campaigns
specifically distinguished in dicta candidate from referenda elections, commenting that
there is a stronger first amendment interest in referenda as opposed to candidate elections.
See Let's Help Fla. v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (N.D. Fla. 1978); Citizens Against
Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 99 Cal. App. 3d 736, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 448, 453 (1979). One court explained that "[t]here is a tighter nexus between a
contributor and a one-issue organization, and a greater likelihood that the contribution will
be used as the contributor wishes than is the case with the attenuated relationship between
a contributor and a political candidate who is obliged to take a position on more than one
issue." Berkeley, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 745, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
As of September 1980, all post-Bellotti decisions have upheld the constitutionality of
various provisions in the federal restrictions. In Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ.
Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 (1978), the court interpreted the restrictions as requiring
an affirmative act to join a labor PAC and rejected an allegation that such an interpretation
violated the associational rights of a majority of the union members. See notes 237-45 infra.
Restrictions on persons or groups who may be solicited by corporate PACs was upheld in
Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., No. 77-2175 (D.D.C. filed
Apr. 24, 1980). This issue is also being addressed in Bread Political Action Comm. v.
Federal Election Comm'n, No. 80-1146 (7th Cir. 1980). For a summary of cases challenging
provisions of the federal campaign finance laws, see 7 CAMPAIGN PRAC. REP., July 7, 1980,
at 4-5.
Bellotti has also spawned litigation regarding state restrictions on corporate political
contributions to candidates. Kentucky's ban on corporate contributions to candidates was
held unconstitutional as applied to a bar association that published the results of a judicial
qualification poll. Kentucky Registry of Election Fin. v. Louisville Bar Ass'n, 579 S.W.2d
622, 626-28 (Ky. App. 1978).
'0 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
1 See, e.g., Wulf, You and I and Corporate Management, 1978 THE NATION 589; Young,
Supreme Court Report, 64 A.B.A.J. 889 (1978); Note, Prohibition of Corporate PoliticalExpenditures: The Effects of First National Bank v. Bellotti, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 95.
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lotti did not hold that corporations have first amendment rights.
The focus throughout that opinion was upon the interests of the
hearer. The Court also hinted that if corporations had actually
dominated the state electoral process, a different analysis would
have been made. 32 Moreover, the federal statute differs from the
Massachusetts ban in one very important aspect. The federal statute allows unlimited political expenditures and limited contributions from funds collected voluntarily from employees and
shareholders; 33 the Massachusetts statute did not provide any alternative means of corporate expression on referenda questions.
This Article analyzes the various arguments that support upholding the federal restrictions and the recent cases that either
undermine or support these arguments.
I
THE PAC AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS OF HEARERS

Federal law allows corporations to use their treasury funds to
organize, administer and, with some restrictions, solicit voluntary
contributions to political action committees (PACs).3 4 The PACs
may use these funds to make contributions to candidates, subject

435 U.S. at 789. See text accompanying notes 216-17 infra.
" The statute challenged in Bellotti specifically prohibited the use of such committees:
"[N]o political committee, and no person acting under the authority of a political committee, or in its behalf, shall solicit or receive from such corporation or such holders of stock
any gift, payment, expenditure, contribution or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute
for any such purpose." MAss. LAws. ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978).
34 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976). The statute permits corporate committees to seek
contributions only from their stockholders, executives, administrative personnel or the
families of these individuals. Id. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i). Union committees may solicit only from
union members and their families. Id. § 441b(b)(4)A)(ii). However, corporate committees
are permitted to seek contributions from all other employees twice per year by mail. 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (Supp. 1II 1979). The same two-per-year limit on mail solicitations
also applies to solicitation of stockholders, executives and administrative personnel by unions. Id. Contributions under $50 that may be solicited only by mail must be received by an
independent third party; the contributions must be collected in a manner that prevents the
corporation or union from determining "who makes a contribution of $50.00 or less ...
and who does not make such a contribution." Id. Corporations without shareholders may
solicit contributions from their members. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(D) (1976). Contributors
may give only $5,000 to a PAC, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (1976). This provision is being
challenged in California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 79-442b (9th Cir.
May 23, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 79-1952 (U.S. June 12, 1980).
32
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to a $5,000 statutory limitation on contributions.3 5 A PAC can
also make unlimited "independent" expenditures on behalf of
candidates. 6 Corporate and union leaders generally determine
the beneficiaries of the contributions and expenditures; contributors to the PACs ordinarily do not know which candidates
will receive the PACs' funds at the time they contribute, and they
37
are not consulted when allocation decisions are made.
The availability of the PAC as an alternative outlet for corporate and union expression must be factored into any discussion of
the constitutionality of the restrictions. The role of these committees bolsters some arguments and undermines others supporting
the constitutionality of the statute. Arguably, the protection afforded corporate speech in Bellotti and Consolidated was intended
to vindicate the interests of hearers. Because the PAC device is an
effective way of preserving those interests no first amendment violation can be found in the federal restrictions. There are, of
course, substantial counter arguments that also will be examined.
A majority of the Court never has explicitly held that commercial, nonmedia corporations have first amendment rights. In
Bellotti, the Court criticized the appellate court for "fram[ing] the
principal question ... as whether and to what extent corporations
have First Amendment rights." 3 8 Pointing out that "[t]he Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party
seeking their vindication," the Court asserted that the proper
question was not "whether corporations 'have' First Amendment
rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of
natural persons" but "whether [the statute] abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 3 9 Later in the
31 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1976). To qualify as a multicandidate committee, the
group must receive contributions from more than 50 persons and, except for state political
party committees, must contribute to five or more federal candidates. Id. §441a(a)(4).
Groups not qualifying as multicandidate committees are subject to the $1,000 contribution
limitation that applies to individuals. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
36 In Buckley, the Court invalidated limitations on independent expenditures made on
behalf of candidates for federal office. 424 U.S. at 51.
37 How Companies Can Finance Politics, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 31, 1976, at 68.
The Federal Election Commission regulations provide: "A corporation, membership organization, cooperative corporation without capital stock, or labor organization may exercise control over its separate segregated fund." 41 Fed. Reg. 35,958 (1976). One commentator has observed that "the issue of control of a separate segregated fund ... is another
critical element in a corporation's or union's interest in establishing a PAC." Comment,
Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1976, 26 CATH. U. L. REv. 756, 773 (1977).
38 435 U.S. at 775-76.
39 Id. at 776.
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opinion, the Court rephrased "[t]he question [as] whether the
corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed speech of
what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection." 40
The Court based its analysis in part upon recent "commercial
speech" cases protecting commercial advertisements "because
[they further] the societal interests in the 'free flow of commercial
information.' "41
If Bellotti may be fairly interpreted to protect corporate
speech because of the interests of the hearers and not because of
a constitutional right of the corporation, a case involving the federal statute could be distinguished from Bellotti because the interests of hearers are protected through the authorization of PAC
expression. Under this view, so long as the PAC device permits
corporate and union expression to reach the hearers, the federal
statute would not violate the first amendment. It is possible, however, that PACs in some way alter corporate and union speech,
and to the extent they do, the first amendment interests of hearers are affected. The content of political expression will probably
not be altered if it is funneled through a PAC, however, because
top corporate and union management generally control PAC
contributions and expenditures.
In Buckley the Court purported to strictly scrutinize restrictions aimed at curbing not only the content but also the quantity
of political expression. 42 It is unclear whether the federal restrictions now act as a restraint on the quantity of corporate and
union expression. Because there is no contemporary experience
with the legal use of union and corporate funds in federal elections other than through PACs, the level of current expenditures
cannot be compared to the level that would be achieved without the
restrictions. 43 Certainly, it is possible that without the PAC re40

Id. at 778.

41 435 U.S. at 783 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
42 424 U.S. at 18-23.
43 Unions have used PACs from the inception of the union contribution ban even
though their validity was uncertain. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 10 (1972), provided for "the establishment, administration, and
solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes." This language was considered ambiguous and corporations were reluctant to set up
PACs until the Federal Election Commission issued the Sun Oil advisory opinion, Federal
Election Comm'n Advisory Op. 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 56, 584 (1975), which clearly stated
that general treasury funds could be used to establish and administer segregated funds for
political solicitation. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, further delineated the proper scope of PAC activities. See generally, Comment, supra note 37, at 760-64.
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quirement even more corporate and union money would be used
for expression in political campaigns. It is clear, on the other
hand, that since the specific authorization of PACs in the 1971
legislation, contributions and expenditures by these entities have
reached vast proportions.4 4 Indeed, many commentators believe
that this is an era of "PAC democracy." 45 Special interest money
in congressional campaigns has reached all-time highs.4 6 It seems
unlikely that the huge volume of funds generated by PACs today
would be exceeded by direct corporate and union giving. In 1978,
Missouri repealed a statute that had banned corporate and union
contributions except through a separate political committee,
apparently upon the assumption that corporations would be reluctant to upset their stockholders by expending the amount of
treasury funds now given through the political committees. 47 Al4 In the last four years the number of corporate PACs mushroomed from approximately 100 to 700. Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1978, at 1, col. 6. Contributions from business and
professional groups to congressional candidates increased from $2.5 million in 1974 to $7.1
million in 1976. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 4. One commentator predicts that
by 1982, 1000 corporate PACs will spend an average of $50,000 each for political campaigns. Approximately 3700 businesses with assets over $1 billion are potential PAC sponsors. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), § AA, at 23 (July 17, 1980).
"' According to Fred Wertheimer, Common Cause Vice President, we are "'heading
toward a new political system of PAC democracy ... with Congress representing the political action committees of America instead of its citizens.'" 5 CAMPAIGN PRAc. REP., Sept. 18,
1978, at 6. He has also claimed that "the PAC system paralyzes the political process ....
Officials will wind up representing PACs, and the system will become tighter and tighter in
terms of its capacity to build choices." Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1978, at 19, col. 1.
46 Special interest group contributions have been estimated at $35 million in the 1978
congressional races. This includes contributions by corporate, labor, trade association and
health groups. 6 CAMPAIGN PRAc. REP., May 28, 1979, at 8-9.

The number of business PACs has grown at a much faster rate than the number of
labor PACs, probably because "all of the political committees set up by a single national or
international union and/or its local unions ... are treated as a single ... committee." 11
C.F.R. § 10.3(a)(1)(ii)(B) (1980). See also 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1976). Fred Wertheimer
explained that "[t]here are only so many international labor unions, but there are tens of
thousands of corporations .... " Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1978, at 1, col. 6. The PACs of
corporate subsidiaries are also treated as part of the parent company's PAC, 11 C.F.R. §
1 10.3(a)(i)(ii)(A) (1980), thus reducing slightly the disparity between the numbers of union
and corporate PACs.
47 See 1978 Mo. Laws, P. 416, § A (repealing old statute and enacting new law codified
at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.029 (Vernon 1980)). Legislative sources explained that
[t]he rationale behind the change ... was organized labor's inability to keep up
with corporations in raising funds through political action committees (PAC's).
Labor is gambling ... that use of its treasury money to fund in-kind contributions of workers, pamphlets and telephones for registration and get-out-thevote drives will exceed the willingness of corporations to use their assets to fund
political candidates-not all of whom will be popular with stockholders. Corporations will continue to rely on PAC's, the theory goes, but their monetary impact will be diluted by the union's treasury-financed, in-kind support.
5 CAMPAIGN PRAC. REP., June 26, 1978, at 8.
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though forcing corporations and unions to use PACs might result
in less expression, contemporary experience suggests that this is
unlikely. In the rare instance where a corporation or union would
be likely to expend treasury funds in an amount not available
through a PAC, the high probability of gaining undue influence
48
over an officeholder would justify a de facto quantity restriction.
In the Bellotti case, Massachusetts made an argument similar
to that outlined above that was apparently rejected by the majority
without comment. Massachusetts argued that the views of persons
affiliated with a corporation would still enter the "marketplace of
ideas" despite the bans. 49 This argument was reflected in the dissenting opinions. Justice Rehnquist commented:
The free flow of information is in no way diminished by the
Commonwealth's decision to permit the operation of business
corporations with limited rights of political expression. All
natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sovereign
than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage in
50
political activity.
Justice White observed:
These individuals would remain perfectly free to communicate
any ideas which could be conveyed by means of the corporate
form. Indeed, such individuals could even form associations for
51
the very purpose of promoting political or ideological causes.
Justice White's conclusion that it would be "unlikely that any
significant communication would be lost by such a prohibition" is
not entirely convincing. It is doubtful that individual shareholders
or officers are able to spend enough money to influence public
opinion. Forming an organization through which they might pool
their resources for greater impact takes time and money. Thus,
some reduction in the overall quantity of corporate views in the
marketplace probably did occur in Massachusetts. On the other
hand, because corporate or union funds, staff and other resources
can be used to organize and administer a PAC, the federal
scheme may actually facilitate such expression.
There are two serious obstacles to the Court's acceptance of
this analysis in a challenge to the federal restrictions. First, it is
unclear whether Bellotti and Consolidated can be fairly read to pro48 See text accompanying notes 86-89 infra.

4 Brief for Appellees at 31, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
435 U.S. at 828.
5' Id. at 807 (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
50
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tect only the first amendment interests of hearers. The second
obstacle, discussed in the next section, is that the federal restrictions place a burden upon the subject matter of expression.
Justices Powell, Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens did not
clearly state in their majority opinion in Bellotti whether corporations are entitled to the same first amendment protection as individuals. Chief Justice Burger, who joined in the majority opinion,
wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he clearly asserted
that corporate speakers should have the same first amendment
rights as individuals. 52 Despite its emphasis on the rights of the
audience and its failure to assert specifically that nonmedia commercial corporations have first amendment rights, the majority's
opinion could be interpreted as consistent with Burger's view. It
clearly rejects the argument of dissenting Justices White and Rehnquist that corporations have only those rights granted them by
the states,5 3 and also rejects the appellate court's assertion that "a
corporation's First Amendment rights must derive from its property rights under the Fourteenth [Amendment]." 5' 4 The Court
noted that "[iun cases where corporate speech has been denied the
shelter of the First Amendment, there is no suggestion that the
reason was because a corporation rather than an individual or as55
sociation was involved."
Nonetheless, the majority's failure to take the next step and
explicitly hold that corporations have first amendment rights is
perhaps more significant. Responding to the assertion that prior
cases granting first amendment protection to corporations involved media or other corporations "through which individuals
express themselves," 56 the majority again stressed the interests of
hearers. They stated that "the press does not have a monopoly on
either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten."5 17 The
majority also criticized the appellate court's view that "the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than
[nonmedia corporations]" on the ground that it was not "respon58
sive to the informational purpose of the First Amendment."
52 Id. at 796-802.
-3 Id. at 778. See the dissenting opinions of justices White, id. at 809-10, and Rehnquist,
id. at 823-24. See also Brief for Appellees at 4, 23-25.
54 435 U.S. at 778 (footnote omitted).
5 Id. at 779 n.14.
56 Id. at 781.
57 Id. at 782 (footnote omitted).
58 Id. at 783 n.18. The majority suggested that on certain issues, voters may wish to
hear the views of nonmedia corporations because of their particular expertise.
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The Court's response to another of Justice White's arguments
buttresses the conclusion that it focused primarily on the interests
of hearers. Justice White argued that corporate expression deserves less protection because "the principal function of the First
Amendment, the use of communication as a means of selfexpression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech." 59 In response, the majority did not
purport to emphasize any interest in corporate self-expression.
Instead, it again noted the informational role of the first amendment. "IT]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members
60
of the public may draw."
A. Chief Justice Burger's Concurring Opinion in Bellotti
Chief Justice Burger was the only member of the Bellotti
Court who explicitly argued that the Constitution gives first
amendment rights not only to media corporations but also to any
other corporate speaker. Although he joined the majority opinion,
he wrote a separate concurrence "to raise some questions likely to
arise in this area in the future." 6 1 His concern was that granting
less than full first amendment protection to nonmedia corporations would eventually endanger the first amendment rights of
media corporations. He asserted that to the extent that there are
rationales for restricting the political speech of nonmedia corporations, these same rationales would support restrictions upon
media corporations.6 2 He also contended that it is simply too difficult "as a matter of fact" to distinguish media from nonmedia
corporations-a difficultly due, in part, to the diversification of
media corporations into nonmedia businesses and vice-versa. 3
1. Distinguishing media from nonmedia corporations. The Chief
Justice's second criticism of the distinction between media and
" Id. at 804-05 (dissenting opinion).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.

at 783.
at 795.

at 796-97.
The majority opinion did note a similar concern:

The suggestion in MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent ...

that the First Amendment

affords less protection to ideas that are not the product of "individual choice"
would seem to apply to newspaper editorials and every other form of speech
created under the auspices of a corporate body. No decision of this Court lends
support to such a restrictive notion.
Id. at 783 n.19.
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nonmedia corporations for first amendment purposes was
grounded in the practical difficulty of clearly delineating these
two groups. His concern is easily illustrated by several examples.
Is an oil company a media corporation if it buys advertising space
to comment on social issues? Does it become a media corporation
if it acquires a newspaper? Is a newspaper publishing company
still a media corporation after it purchases a pulp mill? A solution
may be to focus on the distinction between media activities and
other activities. A diversified corporation, partially involved in the
media, would be entitled to full first amendment protection for its
media-related operations. Under this approach, a newspaper
would not lose its first amendment rights because it purchased a
pulp mill, but it could not extend these rights to its pulp mill
operations. An oil company that purchased a newspaper would
not gain first amendment rights for its oil operations, but it would
be able to assert these first amendment rights in the operation- of
its newspaper.

The problem is not, to paraphrase Chief Justice Burger, the
impracticability of making a distinction, but rather the difficulty
of finding a theory that will justify a distinction. A theory may be
devised by stressing the first amendment goals of "self-expression,
self-realization and self-fulfillment" that all the Justices in Bellotti
recognized, at least implicitly, as irrelevant to corporate speech.6 4
In his dissent, Justice White made a similar argument for such a
distinction to support his view favoring the validation of the corporate bans in Bellotti.6 5 Although rejected by the majority in
dicta, 6 6 the argument could be effectively used to rebut a challenge to the federal statute which is less burdersome to first
amendment interests. Justice White asserted:
[W]hat some have considered to be the principal function of
the first amendment, the use of communication as a means of
self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all
furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the communications of profitmaking corporations are not "an integral part of
the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the af64 The majority asserted that "[t]he individual's interest in self-expression is a concern
of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed discussion
....
" 435 U.S. at 777 n.12. The rights of hearers were stressed throughout the majority
and concurring opinions. The Court never asserted that self-expression was involved in the
corporate speech in Bellotti. See Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act After First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 149, 170 (1979).
65 435 U.S. at 807.
66 435 U.S. at 783 n.19. See note 63 supra.
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firmation of self." They do not represent a manifestation of
6
individual freedom of choice. 1
If this distinction is valid, it could be held that corporate activities involving this element of self-expression by individuals
would be entitled to direct first amendment protection, whereas
all other corporate expression would derive first amendment protection from the rights of hearers. The problem, then, is distinguishing corporate activities that involve such self-expression from
those that do not. Publishing and broadcasting clearly involve the
self-expression of individuals, and these corporate activities would
be entitled to direct first amendment protection. The activities of
corporations organized for the purpose of expression, such as the
NAACP, would also be entitled to direct protection;"" thus, this
analysis would not be appropriate in considering the constitutionality of the federal restrictions as applied to such entities, even
though they are covered by the statute."' What of the oil company that spends funds for "public interest ads" chastizing fuzzythinking liberals for their anti-business biases, or the situation in
Bellotti itself where funds were spent to influence an election? Arguably such activities should not be viewed as the "self-expression"
of any person or group; their first amendment protection would
derive from the interests of hearers.
An argument suprisingly ignored by both the majority and
Chief Justice Burger in Bellotti is that corporate expression merits
first amendment protection because it reflects the self-expression
of at least a majority of shareholders. It is not clear, however, that
a majority of shareholders or union members actually view corporate or union speech as a means to their own self-expression and
U.S. at 804-05.
8 Justice White noted:
Undoubtedly ...there are some corporations formed for the express purpose
of advancing certain ideological causes shared by all their members, or, as in
the case of the press, of disseminating information and ideas. Under such circumstances, association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a means
of achieving effective self-expression.
Id. at 805 (dissenting opinion).
69 The Massachusetts statute invalidated in Bellotti did not restrict nonprofit corporations. The appellant business corporations and banks argued that this exclusion violated
the equal protection clause. See Brief of Appellants at 67-82.
The application of the federal statute to nonprofit organizations raises issues distinct
from those relevant to the application of the restrictions to profit-making corporations. For
example, the interest in protecting dissenting shareholders is inappropriate for nonprofit
corporations because desirable investments are not forfeited as the price of retaining
"stock" in such corporations. See note 234 infra.
67 435
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self-fulfillment. People often espouse political beliefs that are inconsistent with their economic interests. 70 The most accurate
characterization of corporate expression is probably that it reflects
the self-expression of corporate management. It would be improper, however, to protect corporate speech as a means of protecting the self-expression of management because managers are
charged with the responsibility of governing for the benefit of
their shareholders. 7 ' Indeed, the majority in Bellotti suggested
that a derivative suit would be an appropriate remedy for
"disbursements ...

made ...

merely to further the personal in-

72

terests of management."
Certainly a derivative suit would be
inappropriate if corporate management were merely exercising a
constitutional right.
Because expression by commercial corporations cannot properly be viewed as either the self-expression of shareholders or of
corporate management, its first amendment protection should derive solely from the first amendment interests of hearers. The expression of a voluntary PAC, on the other hand, may accurately
be characterized as the self-expression of individuals entitled to

70 Justice White stated in Bellotti that "[sihareholders in such entities do not share a
common set of political or social views, and they certainly have not invested their money
for the purpose of advancing political or social causes or in an enterprise engaged in the
business of disseminating news and opinion." 435 U.S. at 805 (dissenting opinion).
" Although this traditional view of corporate governance is being challenged in some
quarters today, see generally Cary and Goldschmid, Corporate Social Responsibility SymposiumForward: Reflections and Directions, 30 HAST. L. J. 1247 (1979), it is still widely accepted. One
commentator has pointed out that the debate is largely academic so long as directors are
elected by shareholders. Conard, Response: The Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility: Variations on a Theme of Edwin M. Epstein, Id. at 1321, 1325. In any event, even reformers who
would alter the responsibilities of corporate managers are concerned with redirecting that
responsibility toward employees, consumers and society generally. Id. at 1324. It has not
been suggested that managers be permitted to use corporate assets to proliferate their own
political views.
72 435 U.S. at 795. A derivative suit would not protect the interests of minority
shareholders. Because of the broad interpretation that courts currently give to the
concept of corporate benefit, it is unlikely that a derivative suit would be successful in
protecting the interests of even a majority of shareholders who objected to a political
expenditure. See Comment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 781, 791-94 (1973). There are many legal
and practical obstacles discouraging the use of derivative suits even for ultra vires corpo-

rate actions. See J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 49 (1958); Dent, The Power

of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L.
REV. 96 (1980); Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 600 (1980). The Bellotti Court also suggested that corporate democracy
might provide a remedy for shareholders. 435 U.S. at 794. It may be very difficult, however, to v6te out corporate management as the Court suggests. See J.A. LIVINGSTON, supra
at 99.
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direct first amendment protection. 7 3 The intersts of hearers
would provide additional support for first amendment protection
of PAC expression.
This analysis would not necessarily compel validating restrictions upon corporate speech; often, the speech would be protected because of the interests of hearers. In most instances this
analysis would render the same result as if the corporation could
claim its own first amendment rights. If it could be shown, however, that corporate communication would enter the marketplace
of ideas with virtually the same content and quantity despite the
restriction, the application of first amendment strict scrutiny
would not be required. An intermediate standard, or even a mere
rational basis standard, might be appropriate in reviewing such
restrictions. The assertion that strict scrutiny should not be
applied in reviewing the federal restrictions is based in part upon
the availability of ample alternatives for expression. This approach is analogous to the "time, place and manner" cases 74 in
which the availability of such alternatives was an important factor
in the Court's application of an intermediate standard of review.7 5 An even lower standard might be appropriate, however,
71 It is questionable whether funds contributed to political action committees are truly
voluntary. Unions may subtly pressure their members to include a contribution with their
dues. The more obvious problem, however, involves middle- and lower-level corporate
management. The federal statute does not solve the problem by permitting nonanonymous soliticitation of management personnel but denying the right to solicit nonadministrative employees. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(4)(A)(i) (1976). Although it is unlikely that an
assembly line worker would be penalized for not contributing $5.00 to the company PAC,
the visible junior executive who can afford a large contribution and who is seeking
advancement will think twice before refusing to contribute. See Note, Corporate Political
Programs, 70 YALE L. REV. 821, 862 (1961).
"' See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
11 In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, the Court stated in dicta that "a
time, place, and manner restriction cannot be upheld without examination of alternative
avenues of communication open to potential speakers .
100 S. Ct. 2326, 2335 n.10
(1980).
In Buckley, the Court described the time, place and manner cases as permitting a
reasonable regulation of speech to "further an important governmental interest." 424 U.S.
at 18. The Buckley opinion also notes that time, place and manner regulations must "not
discriminate among speakers or ideas." Id. See text accompanying notes 125-32 infra. In
California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 79-4426 (9th Cir. May 23, 1980),
the Ninth Circuit refused to apply strict scrutiny to a federal campaign finance restriction
in part because the association retained "potent alternative means of expression." Slip op.
at 11. The court upheld a provision of the federal campaign finance laws allowing corporations and labor organizations, but not other groups, to make unlimited contributions
to their PACs for administrative costs. Referring to the deference given by the Court in
Buckley regarding the overbreadth of contribution limitations, the court commented that
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when considering the federal restrictions because the time, place
and manner cases involved not only the interests of hearers but
also the interests of speakers who possessed first amendment
rights. Although there may have been no burden on hearers in
such cases because alternative avenues for the communication to
reach them existed, the speakers' own first amendment rights
were burdened because they could not express themselves at the
time, in the place or by the manner that they chose. On the other
hand, when the corporation speaks, arguably only the first
amendment interests of hearers are involved; therefore, a mere
rational basis test may be appropriate if hearers are unaffected by
the restrictions.

76

The analysis suggested in this section should not result in severe incursions into protected speech. It would be appropriate only in a very limited category of cases involving restrictions
"[t]he scrutiny gi~en to a classification affecting a constitutional right is not ... entirely a
mechanical inquiry, determined in the abstract simply by reference to which constitutional
amendment is being considered." Buckley establishes that the constitutional justification required depends in part upon the degree to which the essentials of a constitutional right are
exposed to regulation in the particular case. Slip op. at 12-13 (footnote omitted). The court
concluded: "The minimal nature of the statutory constraints, taken together with the importance of the governmental interest to be served by the regulation, operate to sustain the
constitutionality of the provision in question." Slip. op. at 13.
1 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion), the
Court found that a city did not create a first amendment forum by accepting commercial
advertising on its buses. Thus, th*e city's refusal to accept political advertisements on its
buses was not reviewed under first amendment strict scrutiny. See id. at 303. The Court did
note, however, that "[b]ecause state action exists ... the policies and practices governing
access to the transit system's advertising space must not be arbitrary, capricious or invidious." Id. The Court found "reasonable legislative objectives" were advanced by the restrictions. Id. at 304.
In cases involving economic regulation, the Court has articulated the following standard of review:
It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be
thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (upholding state ban on performing ophthalmological services without a prescription except by licensed optometrists or
opthalmologists).
The Lehman analysis does not seem to differ significantly from that in Williamson. The
Court's acceptance of the weak rationales proffered by the city in Lehman implies that the
Court did not even engage in some form of intermediate scrutiny, such as balancing, which
is frequently utilized in speech cases not involving content regulation. See Stone, Restrictions
of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-MatterRestrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 81, 81 (1978). For an excellent critique of Lehman, see Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle of the First Amendment, 43 U. CH. L. REV. 20, 34-35 (1975).
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that do not alter the content or quantity of expression and speakers whose expression does not involve the self-fulfillment of individuals.
2. The Rationales for Restrictions. Chief Justice Burger viewed
the interests of dissenting shareholders as equally strong in media
and nonmedia corporations; therefore, a rationale based on protecting their interests would pose dangers for the expression of
media corporations.7 7 The shareholders of a media corporation,
however, realize when they invest that their returns will be paid
by a business that publishes or broadcasts the personal political
expression of others. It cannot be assumed that the ordinary
shareholder of other commercial corporations invests with a similar understanding. Thus, their need for protection is stronger.
The Chief Justice also observed that if preventing corporate
domination of the marketplace of ideas is the rationale for the
restrictions, it would apply with even greater force to sustain restrictions upon media corporations. 7 The majority commented
that the potential impact of this argument on the news media is
"unsettling." 79 Previously, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court specifically acknowledged the monopoly position
of newspapers, but found the dangers of government regulation
to be more serious.8 0 Because of the strong precedent forbidding
government regulation of newspapers, it seems unlikely that applying the improper dominance rationale to justify restrictions
upon nonmedia corporations would endanger the expression of
newspapers.8 1 However, the Court's more equivocal stance on
the rights of broadcasters 2 and the extensive regulation already
in effect makes it plausible that the dominance theory could be
used to further restrict broadcasters. Indeed, the Federal Communication Commission's "fairness doctrine" was upheld upon a

" 435 U.S. at 797 (concurring opinion).

7R Id. at 796 (concurring opinion).

11 Id. at 791 n.30.
80 418 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1974) (invalidating statute requiring newspapers provide
criticized candidates right of reply).
"' See, e.g., id.; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating statute prohibiting
electioneering editorials on election day).
82 Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding fairness
doctrine that requires right to reply to personal attack) with Columbia Broadcasting Sys.
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (first amendment does not require that
broadcasters sell time for political editorial advertisements).
In Red Lion, the Court stated that there was no "unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish." 395
U.S. at 388.
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similar rationale. 83 Perhaps the Court should be required to
acknowledge that the media has a more vital first amendment role
than commercial corporations in order to prevent the dominance
theory from providing a constitutional basis for sustaining restrictions upon the broadcast media. Such a conclusion would be consistent with history and tradition,8 4 and the absence of individual
self-expression in the speech of nonmedia corporations would
provide a basis for such a conclusion. The Court's dicta in Bellotti,
however, apparently rejected this view.8 5 If the dominance
rationale is rejected because of the fear that it might be extended
to cases involving regulation of the media, the statute could be
upheld on other grounds.86 The government interests allegedly
promoted by the federal restrictions are discussed in Section III.
B. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission
One of the most recent cases creating obstacles for the
constitutionality of the federal restrictions upon corporate and
union contributions and expenditures is Consolidated Edision Co. v.
Public Service Commission.87 In that case, a private utility enclosed
inserts advocating nuclear energy with its billing statements. The
New York Public Service Commission (Commission) responded by
promulgating a regulation prohibiting utilities from sending bill
inserts discussing "controversial issues of public policy." ' l The
Commission argued that the restriction was necessary to "avoid
forcing Consolidated Edison's views on a captive audience." 8'
83 395 U.S. at 375. The fairness doctrine is a general requirement that broadcasters
"afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public
importance." 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1980). The doctrine requires broadcasters to give individuals or groups the right to respond to attacks on their integrity, character or honesty.
See Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillarsin the Forum
of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 472 (1968). Red Lion specifically upheld this aspect of
the fairness doctrine.
Using a similar theory, the Court has upheld a requirement that broadcasters divest
themselves of newspapers as a condition for licensing. FCC v. National Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
84 For a discussion of the vital role that the press has played in the history of the
United States, see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 162 (1973) (concurring opinion, Douglas, J.)
85 See note 63 supra. See also text accompanying notes 57-58 supra (institutional corporate press not entitled to greater first amendment protection).
86 The prevention of corruption and the protection of dissenters who object to the use
of funds for political purposes have been asserted as rationales for the restrictions. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 186-207, 233-67 infra.
87 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980).
88
89

Id. at 2330.
Id. at 2335.
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The Supreme Court invalidated the regulation on first amendment grounds. 90 It concluded that consumers could avoid the
objectionable speech simply by averting their eyes.91
Consolidated is not entirely inconsistent with the thesis that the
expression of commercial corporations deserves protection only so
that the first amendment interests of hearers may be preserved.
Like the majority opinion in Bellotti, the opinion in Consolidated
appears to b'e grounded upon the interests of hearers. The Consolidated Court applied strict scrutiny because "[a] less stringent
analysis would permit a government to slight the First Amendment's role in 'affording the public access to discussion, debate
and the dissemination of information and ideas.' "92 Consolidated
may also be factually distinguished from a case involving the federal restrictions. Unlike the federal statute, which authorizes an
alternative outlet for expression-PACs, the Commission's regulation in Consolidated probably reduced the quantity of the utility's
speech on controversial issues. The utility asserted in Consolidated
that it "ha[d] no adequate alternatives to the use of bill inserts for
communicating to [its] customers [its] views on controversial matters of public policy." 93 The Consolidated Court, however, did not
address the issue of whether comparable atlernative avenues for
expression were actually available. Instead, the Court noted that it
had "consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may
justify a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers
have alternative means of expression." 94 For this reason, Consoli9OId. at 2335-36.
91 Id. at 2335.
92 Id. at 2335 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
91 Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 15, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980) (affidavit of Robert 0. Lehman, Vice President for Public
Affairs, Consolidated Edison Co.). The company presented this evidence to the Commissio'n. Mr. Lehman's affidavit discussed in detail the relative cost efficiency of various
methods for communicating to the public:
A separate mailing would be prohibitively expensive. We have a monthly basic
bill run of 2.8 million. Postage alone, at first class mail rates, would cost in
excess of $350,000. Even at bulk mail rates, postage would cost $210,000....
Television is not an adequate or effective medium for communicating
lengthy messages on complicated subjects to a mass audience....
Newspaper advertising is more expensive in reaching as wide an audience
among our customers as bill inserts.
Appendix to Brief for Appellant at 15-17. See generally Reply Brief of Appellant at 12.
91 100 S. Ct. at 2335 n.10. The Court cited three cases for this proposition. Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), was a commercial speech case in which the Court invalidated a ban on advertising of prescription
drug prices. The Court rejected the assertion that consumers could seek out the informa-
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dated is particularly troublesome for the theory that an intermediate standard of review is appropriate because the federal restrictions provide the alternative outlet of PAC expression.
Clearly the crucial factor for the majority in Consolidated was that
the restriction was placed upon the subject matter of speech."-Because the corporate and union restrictions are also based on the
subject matter of speech, 96 Consolidated poses very serious problems for any theory that might sustain the federal restrictions.
The significance of subject matter restrictions is examined in the
next section.

97

II
SUBJECT MATTER REGULATION AND THE FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON
CORPORATE AND UNION POLITICAL SPENDING

The subject matter restriction issue arises in the context of
both equal protection and first amendment analyses. These two
approaches differ slightly, and this difference has important
ramifications because the equal protection requirement creates
additional constitutional difficulties for the federal statute."
There is, however, much overlap between the two analyses. The
Court frequently relies upon equal protection cases in its first
amendment analysis and first amendment cases in its equal protection analysis. 9 9 Each approach is separately examined in the
following sub-sections.

tion themselves. Id. at 757 n.15. The second case cited was Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405 (1974) in which the Court reversed a conviction under a state flag desecration statute.
The Court rejected the state's argument that the defendant could express his anti-war
views by other means. Id. at 411 n.4. In Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 556 (1975), the third case cited, the Court held that a city's refusal to allow presentation of the musical "Hair" in a city-owned theater violated the plaintiff's first
amendment rights notwithstanding the availability of other theaters.
1100 S. Ct. at 2331.
96 The statute refers to expenditures or contributions made "in connection with" a federal election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976).
97 Even if the Court rejects the proposition that a standard of review less stringent than
strict scrutiny should apply to the federal statute, the restrictions might still be upheld as
necessary to a compelling state interest. The government interests asserted in support of
the restrictions are examined in section III infra.
98 See text accompanying notes 135-138 infra.
99 See, e.g., the Court's reliance on Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972), in Consolidated, 100 S. Ct. at 2332-33, and Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785, Mosley was an
equal protection case, even though its analysis rested primarily upon first amendment
theory and cases. See Karst, supra note 76, at 27.
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A. The First Amendment Challenge to Subject Matter Restrictions
In the Consolidated opinion, the Court cited Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley' 0 0 for the proposition that "[a]s a general matter 'the First Amendment means that the government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."'101 Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion described this quoted dicta from Mosley as "hyperbole," 102
arguing that the majority's analysis refuted this statement because
the Court did inquire whether the first amendment burden was
justified by a compelling state interest. 10 3 Such an inquiry would
have been irrelevant had the government actually "lacked power
to restrict expression because of its ...subject matter." 104 Stevens also cited numerous Supreme Court cases upholding subject
matter restrictions using less than a strict scrutiny standard of review.' o5
Other commentators have noted the Court's confusion regarding the proper standard of review for subject matter restrictions.' 0 6 In some cases, such as Consolidated and Bellotti, the Court
has applied strict scrutiny ostensibly because of the subject matter
distinction. In other cases, it has ignored obvious subject matter
burdens and treated such statutes as content-neutral. Although
the precise standard of review is seldom articulated, the tests
applied in cases treating such restrictions as content neutral seem
to require some form of intermediate scrutiny,' t17 or even a mere
18
rational basis.'
The numerous recent cases in which subject matter restrictions were upheld had one factor in common; the restrictions
were viewpoint neutral. 10 9 The Court specifically referred to this
100408 U.S. 92 (1971).
101 100 S. Ct. at 2333 (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
102

100 S. Ct. at 2337, 2337.

103 Id.
104

at 2338.

Id. at 2337.

Id. at 2337 n.2.
100 Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727
105

(1980); Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Control: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter
Restrictions, 46 U. CHi. L. REv. 81 (1978).
"07 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Farber, supra note 106 at 749-62;
Stone, supra note 106, at 84-100.
108See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion);
Farber, supra note 106, at 761-62; Stone, supra note 106, at 90-92. For a discussion of the
standard of review used in Lehman, see note 76 supra.
109 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacific Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regulation banning broadcast of indecent language); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)
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neutrality in upholding subject matter restrictions in several of
these cases.1 1 0 The holdings of these cases, together with the
Court's various comments, have led some commentators to suggest
that a lesser degree of scrutiny might be appropriate for
viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions. Professor Farber has
proposed an intermediate standard of review similar to that used
in equal protection challenges of sex and illegitimacy classifications.1" ' He further asserts that this standard "closely fits the results in the content regulation cases." 112 Professor Stone takes a
somewhat more modest position, suggesting that at least some
viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions might appropriately
be subject to less than the strictest form of first amendmepit review. He explains that content discrimination is particularly disfavored for two reasons. Focusing on these reasons aids in determining which viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions should
be reviewed with the strictest of scrutiny.
First, Stone argues that content discrimination not only limits
access to information but also distorts decisionmaking processes by
(zoning ordinance prohibiting clustering of adult movie theaters); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (limitations on political contributions to federal candidates and disclosure
requirements); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (ban on distribution of partisan political literature on military base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)
(ban on political advertisements on city busses); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973) (restrictions on political expression by state civil service employees); Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (restrictions on political
expression by federal civil service employees); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728 (1970) (postal regulation allowing recipients of obscene mailings to request
postmaster to direct sender to refrain from further mailings).
Stone has argued that it is somewhat misleading to characterize expression concerned
with sex as viewpoint-neutral, as Justice Stevens did in American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. at
70. Stone points out that such expressions "almost invariably carry an implicit, if not
explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sexual mores." Stone, supra note 106, at 111-12.
110 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 744-48 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young
v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974) (plurality opinion); Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616 (1973); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).
", He would also apply a second test referred to as "balancing" in cases in which there is a
substantial-as opposed to a de minimis-burden on speech. Farber, supra note 106, at 748.
Most viewpoint-neutral sulsject matter restrictions would, therefore, be subjected to both
tests under his theory. He only cites Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (plurality opinion), as an example of a case in which there was a de minimis burden
upon speech. Farber, supra note 106, at 748. Although Farber apparently sees the de
minimis category as very narrow, the danger that a court would use such a theory for
intrusions into first amendment rights seems ominous. Farber would apply strict scrutiny to
restrictions based on viewpoint. Id. at 729.
112 Farber, supra note 106, at 739. Professor Farber did not discuss the Bellotti opinion,
and Consolidated was decided after his article was published.
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leaving "the public with only an incomplete-and perhaps
inaccurate-perception of their social and political universe." 113
His second reason focuses upon the motive behind the restriction:
"it is per se impermissible for government to restrict speech because it disapproves of the message conveyed." 114 The Bellotti
opinion reflects both of these concerns. It states that "channel[ing]
the expression of views is unacceptable ...[elspecially where, as
here, the legislature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt
to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in
expressing its views to the people .... . 1115 By contrast, the federal restrictions on corporate and union political expression do
not prevent the public from hearing a particular side of an issue.
PACs may actually facilitate the publicizing of corporate and
1 16
union views.
According to Stone, one way to determine which subject matter restrictions should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis
is to ascertain whether "governmental opposition to the speech ...
played any appreciable role" in the enactment of the restriction. 11 7 Although the Bellotti Court apparently attempted this inquiry, Professor Stone believes that it is probably too cumbersome
to carry out effectively. 18 As an alternative, he offers an objective criterion. Claiming that the breadth of the subject matter re113 Stone, supra note 106, at 101.
at 103 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.31; Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil-

114 Id.

lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)).
115 435 U.S. at 785.
116 Even if restrictions do limit expression, distortion of the marketplace of ideas is diminished because corporations and unions, which often promote opposing positions or
candidates, are limited in the same manner. Corporations and unions may at times, however, exert political pressure on the same side of a controversy. See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE,
How MONEY TALKS IN CONGRESS 10-12 (1979) (maritime unions and the shipping industry). Thus, muting the voices of both corporations and unions could distort the marketplace of ideas on some issues.
When the restrictions were initially enacted, they were apparently designed in part to
eliminate the influence of corporations and unions on the electoral process. See, e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948). The emphasis, however, appears to have
shifted to the protection of dissenters-particularly for the union restrictions. See text accompanying notes 246-53 infra. In Bellotti the Court stressed in dicta that the purpose for
the corporate restrictions was the prevention of corruption. 435 U.S. at 788 n.26. Although
the initial purpose of the restrictions might have been inconsistent with the view that government cannot restrict speech because of its content, this no longer appears to be the
legislative motive. The specific authorization of PACs in the 1971 legislation and the present high level of PAC expression supports this conclusion because the statutory scheme
assures that corporations and unions will have ample opportunities to influence the electorate. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
1'7Stone, supra note 106, at 105.
"I Id. at 105-07.
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striction often provides the key to ascertaining the motive behind
it, Stone suggests that broad subject matter restrictions might be
treated as content-neutral while narrow restrictions should be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny: tt9
Unlike the class of narrowly defined restrictions, [broad statutory restrictions] possess what may be the most important attribute of content-neutral restrictions. That is, although such a
statute may at times have de facto, viewpoint-differential effects, those effects are likely to be spread over a fairly wide
range of issues, thus mitigating the risk that the restriction is
tainted by an improper legislative motivation directed against a
1 20
particular viewpoint.

The Bellotti majority implicitly recognized this distinction. The
Massachusetts statute banning contributions or expenditures not
"materially affecting ... the corporation" contained the caveat
that "[n]o question submitted to the voters solely concerning the
taxation of the income, property or transactions of individuals
shall be deemed materially to affect ... the corporation." 121 The
Court commented:
The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been singled out for special treatment undermines the likelihood of a
genuine state interest in protecting shareholders. It suggests instead that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing corporations on a particular subject. Indeed, appellee has
conceded that "the legislative and judicial history of the statute
indicates ... that the second crime was 'tailormade' to prohibit

corporate campaign contributions
to oppose a graduated in22
come tax amendment."

1

119Id. at 109-11. He acknowledged the possible ambiguity in this distinction. Id. at 112
n.137. The distinction between broad and narrow subject matter discrimination was also
suggested by a student author who noted that "[t]he cases ... indicate that the standard of
review employed in analyzing the competing interests will vary according to the specificity
of the challenged regulation." Comment, Corporate and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures under 2 U.S.C. § 441b: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 291, 307. The
author did not suggest a rationale for this distinction.
120 Stone, supra note 106, at 112. Stone believes that broad subject matter discrimination,
although potentially serious, poses problems "virtually indistinguishable from those posed
by content-neutral restrictions." Id. at 113. Therefore, he suggests that the balancing test
used in content-neutral cases may be more appropriate than the strict scrutiny test used in
viewpoint-neutral content restriction cases. Id. at 113-14. The discriminatory restriction
should still be justified by "some substantial governmental purpose." Id. at 114.
121 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978).
122 435 U.S. at 793 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 6). Professor Stone has not attempted
to categorize the Bellotti statute as either narrow or broad. He mentions the case only in a
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Using Stone's analysis, Bellotti can be explained as a case in which
the legislative motive of preventing corporations from expressing
their views on a particular subject was properly implied from the
narrowness of restriction. Thus, the Court's application of strict
scrutiny was appropriate. Bellotti, then, may not require that the
broad federal restrictions on corporate and union expression in
connection with elections for federal office be subjected to strict
scrutiny.
Stone's thesis is particularly appealing when considering a statute that leaves ample alternative avenues for communicating
about a restricted subject matter. 2 3 Indeed, in almost all of the
cases in which subject matter restrictions were upheld, expression
on a particular subject was not completely banned.124 Stone's
analysis is more difficult to accept in the context of absolute bans,
such as the prohibitions upon certain kinds of political expression
by civil service employees that have been upheld by the Court. 2 I
Limited to cases involving time, place and manner restrictions of
speech, such a doctrine would involve a minimal and easily confootnote to support the proposition that "the Court itself has recognized in passing that
these seemingly viewpoint-neutral restrictions may have viewpoint-differential effects."
Stone, supra note 106, at 110 & n. 132. Bellotti is difficult to categorize because the statute
contained restrictions that were both broad (the proscription against expending funds on
referenda not materially affecting the corporation) and narrow (the caveat that questions
concerning the taxation of individuals did not materially affect the corporation). Because
the issue in Bellotti dealt with the narrow restriction, the case fits nicely into Stone's theory.
It can be presumed, however, that the broader restriction was also invalidated. The Court's
expansive language indicates that the result would have been the same if the referendum
involved an issue other than taxation. See 435 U.S. at 788-95. The Buckley case, which dealt
with a broad limitation upon all contributions to federal elections, also supports Stone's
thesis. The subject matter restriction was ignored in that case and strict scrutiny was
applied because of the "direct quantity restrictions." 424 U.S. at 18. The Court described
the limitations in Buckley as "not [focusing] on the ideas expressed by persons or groups
subjected to its regulations." Id. at 17.
12 The Ninth Circuit, in California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 794426 (9th Cir. May 23, 1980), applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold provisions of the
federal campaign finance laws, partially because of the availability of alternative avenues
for expression. See note 75 supra.
124 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (requirement
that theaters showing sexually explicit movies not concentrate on one area); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (distribution of political literature on military base banned);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political advertising on busses
banned).
125 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1978); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v.
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1978). Broadrick upheld a state statute
similar to the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7327 (1976), that prohibited certain political
activities by state employees. Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1976),
which prohibits federal civil service employees from participating in various partisan political activities, was held constitutional in Letter Carriers.
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tained incursion into first amendment interests. Although it has in
the past asserted that time, place and manner analysis is inappropriate when regulations discriminate against speakers or
ideas, t2 6 the Court prior to Consolidated failed to apply this analysis
only in cases in which the content discrimination actually involved
viewpoint bias. 2 7 Thus, there seemed a fair chance that the federal restrictions would be reviewed using the time, place and
manner analysis. If the restrictions were "reasonable" and served
an "important" interest,1 28 they would be constitutionally valid.
Consolidated is clearly the most serious obstacle to the application of an intermediate form of review to the fedeal restrictions.
The Court in Consolidated specifically rejected the argument that
the time, place and manner approach would be appropriate when
a statute restricted subject matter, as opposed to viewpoint. The
Court stated:
The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints,
but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.... To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth. 129
Even though Consolidated seems inconsistent with the numerous cases upholding viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions,
the clear and unequivocal language in that case would make it

126 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 18.
127 See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980) (preference for labor picketing);
Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ban of for sale
signs); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (flag desecration statute invalidly
applied to antiwar protest); Papish v. University of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1970)
(student punished for publishing nonobscene sexually-related expression in school newspaper); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (preference for labor picketing).
The absolute restrictions of the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti could be characterized
as mere time, place and manner restrictions only if the Court focused on the ability of
shareholders to contribute as individuals and through other groups. Even if this characterization could be adopted, it is unclear whether this would save the restrictions because the
statute probably reduced the overall quantity of expression. In Buckley strict scrutiny was
required because of the "direct quantity restriction." 424 U.S. at 18. In any event, the
Bellotti Court concluded that the legislature had purposely restricted corporate speech to
prevent these speakers from influencing the electorate; thus, the statute was not
viewpoint-neutral. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
128 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 18.
129 100 S. Ct. at 2333.
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very difficult for the Court to apply less than strict scrutiny to the
federal campaign restrictions. If the Court, however, ignores its
own broad language, which seems unlikely, Consolidated, like Bellotti, could fit into the analytical framework suggested by Professor
Stone. The regulation in Consolidated, which applied to "controversial issues of public policy," appears to create a broad subject matter category that under Stone's analysis would be treated
as viewpoint-neutral. Because it applied only to public utilities,
however, it is more appropriate to characterize the restriction as
applying to the views of public utilities upon controversial issues
of public importance. The motive to suppress a point of view
seems just as obvious when the narrowness of the restriction
applies to the category of speakers as when it applies to the subject matter.1 30 Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion describes
the regulation in Consolidated as "nothing more than a desire to
curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial
issues of general interest [, amounting to] the purest example of a
'law abridging the freedom of speech.' "131
Although Stone's analysis offers some hope that the Court
could apply less than strict scrutiny to the federal restrictions
upon corporate and union political expression, such a result
seems highly unlikely. The Court would be forced to either ignore
or repudiate the unequivocal language in Consolidated; therefore,
it would probably apply strict scrutiny to the restrictions. In the

'30 The utility in Consolidated argued that the restriction was not viewpoint-neutral:
"Contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, the Commission's ban does prohibit the expression of one position on hotly debated issues." Brief for Appellants at 16. See also Reply
Brief for Appellants at 3.
131 Id. at 2338 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). justice Stevens observed
in a footnote:
Even viewing the restriction as merely a neutral subject matter regulation
(controversial issues generally) as may have been intended initially by the
Commission, rather than a restriction of a particular viewpoint (the utilities'
opinions on those issues), I still believe it to be unconstitutional. For the use of
the "controversial" nature of speech as the touchstone for its regulation
threatens a value at the very core of the First Amendment, the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
Id. at 2339 n.9 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Justice
Stevens' initial interpretation of the Commission's motives is probably correct. The Commission commented that the ban was for the purpose of eliminating "an unreasonable
advantage ... that unduly discriminates against others who ... oppose the company's
views." Order of the New York State Public Service Comm'n, Feb. 25, 1,977, Slip op. at 7,
17 N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Rep. (reprinted in Appendix G to Jurisdictional Statement of
Appellants, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980)).
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Burger Court, although such an approach no longer spells certain
doom for a statute, it does make affirmance unlikely. 13 2
B. The Equal Protection Analysis
Equal protection analysis requires a focus not only upon ends
but also upon means. To this extent, it overlaps with cases in
which speech burdens are analyzed under the first amendment
without reference to equal protection. In both equal protection
and first amendment analyses, even a compelling state interest
13 3
cannot be pursued by means that are unnecessarily broad.
Thus, either equal protection or straight first amendment analysis
would produce the same result in overinclusiveness cases. 13 4 Equal
protection analysis, at least in cases in which fundamental rights
such as speech are involved,'1 35 also requires that the restrictions
not be underinclusive.1 36 The underinclusiveness issue is confusing; every content regulation by definition is underinclusive.
For instance, a burden placed upon persons who advocate the
overthrow of the government is underinclusive because it does not
also place a burden upon persons who advocate patriotism. Why
then would such a case be analyzed as strictly a first amendment
rather than an equal protection problem?.The answer is found in
basic equal protection theory. The distinction in this hypothetical
is related to the purpose of the statute.' 37 It would make no
132 The Court upheld contribution limitations in Buckley even though it purported to

apply strict scrutiny. 424 U.S. at 27-29. The limitations in that case, like the restrictions on
corporate and union political spending, were based on subject matter. The Buckley Court,
however, ignored that aspect of the case.
A burden upon the right to vote, like a burden upon speech, triggers strict scrutiny
review. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735-36 (1973), and American Party of Tex. v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 780-83 (1973), the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny to ballot
qualification statutes and upheld their constitutionality. Although the Court used the language of strict scrutiny in Buckley, Storer and American Party, it is unclear whether their
methodology was consistent with strict scrutiny review. See Nicholson, supra note 8, at 34647, 347 n.105, 357, 365. Storer and American were the first cases since Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the wartime internment of Japanese-Americans), in
which the Court sustained the validity of legislation under strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis.
1 See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967).
134 The federal restrictions' potential overbreadth is discussed in section IIl.
13' In business regulation cases not involving fundamental rights, the underinclusive nature of the regulation has not invalidated discriminatory statutes. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
136 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
137 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 341, 346
(1949).
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sense to burden those espousing patriotism in order to enhance
national security. Thus, the statute is not underinclusive with respect to its purpose. It may be overinclusive1 38 and although the
Court ordinarily treats such cases under the rubric of first
amendment overbreadth, an equal protection or first amendment
analysis should lead to the same result and involve the same
methodology. As a result, the first amendment and equal protection analyses require in speech cases restrictions that are not
overinclusive with respect to the purpose of the statute. An equal
protection analysis adds one further requirement-the restrictions
also must not be underinclusive with respect to their purpose.
Appellants argued in Bellotti that the Massachusetts statute
was overinclusive to protect dissenting shareholders because it unnecessarily banned even those corporate contributions backed by
unanimous shareholder approval,'13" and underinclusive because
it prohibited corporate expression only on certain subjects even
though shareholders probably disapproved of other subjects as
well. The appellants also pointed out that only corporations were
subject to the Massachusetts statute; the rights of unions and
other business entities, such as business trusts and real estate in1 40
vestment trusts, were unaffected.
The Bellotti court accepted appellant's characterization of the
Massachusetts statute as both overinclusive and underinclusive.
Using this characterization, the Court concluded that the purpose
of protecting dissenting shareholders was "belied" 141 and invalidated the bans using phraseology similiar to that used in
middle-tier equal protection analysis.1 42 Because the federal stat138 Cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (statute requiring individual registration if involved with Communist group overbroad because nature of relationship not
considered).
139 Brief for Appellants at 76 n.55, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
140 Id.

at 77-82.

141 435 U.S. at 793.

142"Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest under
the circumstances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking."
435 U.S. at 795 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960)) (emphasis supplied).
This language is similar to that used in gender-based discrimination cases. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
It is unclear why the Belotti Court did not invalidate the statute on its face for first
amendment overbreadth. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court held
that facial invalidation is not appropriate "particularly where conduct and not merely
speech is involved" unless the overbreadth is "substantial ... in relation to [its] plainly
legitimate sweep." Id. at 615. If the federal restrictions are overinclusive, facial invalidation
may be appropriate because the court in Buckley rejected the argument that political contributions are not pure speech. 424 U.S. at 16-17.
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ute authorizes PAC expression, it is substantially less overinclusive than the Massachusetts ban. 14 3 The federal statute is arguably the least restrictive means for protecting minority shareholders and union members. 44 Yet the underinclusive problem
remains -although
they burden both unions and corporations,
the federal restrictions, like the statute in Bellotti, do not apply to
other business entities. The federal statute may also be underinclusive because it applies only to political expression "in connection
with" federal elections. 1 45 Whether the federal restrictions survive on equal protection challenge may turn on the degree of
scrutiny that the Court applies to these underinclusive classifications. This question is examined in the following subsections.
1. The TheoreticalJustificationsfor Invalidating Underinclusive Legislation. Tussman and tenBroek state in their classic equal protection
analysis that the courts have generally interpreted the equal protection
clause to require a reasonable legislative classification-"one which
includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law." 146 Common sense dictates that Courts would be
more offended by overinclusive legislative burdens because "in the
[underinclusive classification], all who are included in the class are at
least tainted by the mischief at which the law aims; while overinclusive classifications reach out to the innocent bystander, the hapless victim of circumstance or association." 147 Indeed, the courts
have given legislatures substantial discretion to create underinclusive
classifications. Tussman and tenBroek explain:
[t]he Court has defended under-inclusive classifications on such
grounds as: the legislature may attack a general problem in a
piecemeal fashion; "some play must be allowed for the joints of
the machine"; "a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and
hitting it presumably where experience shows it to be most felt,
is not to be upset.... ."; "the law does all that is needed when it
does all that can .... "; and-perhaps with some impatience-

143

The federal statute is somewhat overinclusive for achieving the goals of preventing

corruption and the domination of the electoral process. See text accompanying notes 19092, 230 infra. Arguably, the overinclusiveness alone could cause invalidation. See note
142 supra.
a44 See text accompanying notes 234-42 infra.
145 2 U.S.C. § 441b (a) (1976).
146 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 137, at 346.
147 Id. at 351.
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the equal protection clause is not "a pedagogic requirement of

the impractical."

148

These expressions of judicial tolerance, Tussman and tenBroek
conclude, "are not ...

very helpful [because t]hey do not consti-

tute a clear statement of the circumstances and conditions which
justify such tolerance-which justify a departure from the strict
requirements of the principle of equality." 149
In his concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York,' 5 ° Justice Jackson discussed the judicial policy towards
underinclusive classifications:
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick
and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
5
upon them if larger numbers were affected.' '

Eliminating underinclusive coverage of similarly-situated individuals guards against the danger that the politically powerless will
bear the brunt of governmental burdens while the powerful will
be excluded. Cases in which the Court has invalidated underinclusive statutes that burden fundamental rights illustrate this
concern. In Skinner v. Oklahoma 152 the Court invalidated a statute
requiring the sterilization of all habitual criminals except those
convicted of white collar crimes. Certainly the white collar legis-

148

Id. at 348 (footnotes omitted) (quoting respectively Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v.

May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904); Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v.' Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227
(1914); Buick v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)).
149 Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 137, at 348.
"50 336 U.S. 106, 111-17 (1949). In Railway Express, the Court held that an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of any advertising vehicles on city streets, except those carrying
advertisements of products made by the owner of the vehicle, did not violate the due
process, equal protection, or commerce clauses. Id. at 108-11. The majority dismissed the
equal protection claim, stating:
[Tihe fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of
distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different
category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated
or none at all.
Id. at 110.
151 Id. at 112-13.
152 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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lators in Skinner needed little prompting to exclude white collar
criminals from sterilization.
The first case to use the equal protection analysis in a first
amendment context was Niemotko v. Maryland.'5 3 The Court held
that a group of Jehovah's Witnesses were denied equal protection
of the laws when a city council failed to grant them the right to
use a public park while permitting- other religious and civic organizations to use it.'

54

Treating Jehovah's Witnesses differently

than more popular religious groups also accords with Justice
Jackson's analysis. The Court invalidated a statute prohibiting all
picketing other than peaceful labor picketing near schools in
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley.' 55 In Carey v. Brown,' 56 decided in 1980, the court invalidated a similar statute prohibiting
picketing in residential areas. Creating an exception for labor
picketing may have reflected both the strong political influence of
labor and the legislators' disdain for politically less powerful
groups such as anti-war demonstrators and civil rights workers. 5 7
There is perhaps no better example of a statute that does not
represent the problem referred to by Justice Jackson than the
federal bans on corporate and union political expression. The
burdens placed upon corporations and unions certainly are not
attributable to a lack of political power. The exclusion of business
trusts and partnerships has nothing to do with political power. On
the contrary, such entities were probably excluded because histori-

cally they have not been significantly involved in the political pro58
cess on the federal level.'
2. The Appropriate Standard of Review in Cases Involving Underinclusive Burdens on Fundamental Rights. Neither Tussman and
153 340 U.S. 268 (1950).
,51 Id. at 272-73. The Court held that the selective application of the permit requirement
violated the appellant's rights under the equal protection clause. An alternative ground for
the decision was the "limitless discretion" possessed by the park commissioner and the city
council in granting park use permits. Id.
155 408 U.S. 92 (1971).
156100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980).
,5" The original plaintiffs in both Mosley and Carey were civil rights demonstrators.
15' In a colloquy between Senators Taft and Magnuson during the debate over the
Taft-Hartley Act (which enacted the first set of restrictions on political spending by labor
unions, see note 3 supra), it was recognized that all other organizations except labor unions
and corporations would not be restricted from raising and spending money for political
purposes. 93 CONG. R~c. 6440-41 (1947). Responding to Senator Magnuson's concern that
leaving other organizations unrestricted under the Act might not control the abuses
targeted by the Act, Senator Taft also noted that: "[I]f any abuses arise with respect to
other organizations we can extend the provision of law to the other groups." Id. at 6441.
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tenBroek's discussion of underinclusive classifications nor Justice
Jackson's explanation in Railway Express involved a case in which
fundamental rights were burdened. The Court has frequently asserted that statutes touching upon fundamental rights must be
precisely drawn. 1 59 Does this mean that an otherwise valid regulation must fall if it leaves out a few entities or subjects that potentially involve the same problems? Would the Court require a
compelling state interest for any exclusion? Closer examination of
the Court's rhetoric and methodology in the cases invalidating
underinclusive burdens upon fundamental rights may be helpful
in answering this question.
In Skinner, the first case reviewing an underinclusive burden
upon a fundamental right, the Court commented that the state "is
[not] prevented by the equal protection clause from confining 'its
restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to
be clearest.""'1 " It is obvious in Skinner that there was not even a
rational basis for excluding white collar criminals from the law
requiring the sterilization of all hereditary criminals. Referring to
Oklahoma's distinction between larceny by fraud or embezzlement
and larceny by trespass, the Court stated that it "ha[d] not the
slightest basis for inferring that that line has any significance in
eugenics, nor that the inheritability of criminal traits follows the
neat legal distinctions which the law has marked between those
two offenses."' 6' At the time Skinner was decided, the requirement of a mere rational basis to uphold a classification meant that
no scrutiny at all would be applied.' 6 2 It seems clear that in Skinner the application of a test which actually required the state to
present even a plausible rationale for excluding some groups from
the legislative burdens would have also resulted in invalidation.
The equal protection cases involving underinclusive burdens
upon expression involve subject matter discrimination; therefore,
it may be helpful to recall the suggestions of Professors Farber
and Stone that an intermediate standard of review might be appropriate for viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions. Farber
suggests that this level of scrutiny is similar to that employed in
sex and illegitimacy cases: "[A] classification must substantially
159See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969).
160316 U.S. at 540 (quoting Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 384 (1915)).
161 See id. at 542.

162 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 19 (1972).
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further an important government interest ... [A] mere recitation

of a benign. purpose as the justification for a classification is not
enough., The asserted purpose must be plausible in light of the
legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment
of the legislation." 163 Neither Farber nor Stone suggest that underinclusive classifications should be treated differently than overinclusive classifications. Intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny, however, seems much more appealing for underinclusive classifications because the effect of sustaining such statutes is merely to
burden fewer persons or subjects. Intermediate or middle-tier
scrutiny of overinclusive classifications could result in sustaining
unnecessary burdens upon first amendment interests. The Court
appeared to use the language of middle-tier analysis rather than
strict scrutiny in Mosley. 164 It stated that "discriminations among
pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest."' 16 .5 In Carey, the Court found the "Illinois Residential Picketing Statute ...constitutionally indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidated in Mosley." 166 The language used in Carey,
however, was slightly more restrictive than that of Mosley: "IT]he
Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications of'
fered for any distinctions it draws must be carefuly scrutinized."' 6

163 Farber, supra note 106, at 738 (footnotes omitted). Professor Stone would require
that the state explain "why it failed to restrict the speech it exempted from the restriction.
It must, in other words, justify the content-based distinction." Stone, supra note 106, at 114.
He concludes that such a showing
is necessary, not so much because the distinction may pose a threat to the interests underlying the special treatment of content-based restrictions, but rather
because the very existence of the content-based distinction tends to undercut
the state's showing, required even in the context of content-neutral balancing,
that the restriction is designed to serve some substantial governmental purpose.
Id. Several of the cases in which viewpoint-neutral subject matter restrictions were upheld
using less than strict scrutiny review involved equal protection challenges. See, e.g., Young
v. American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (plurality opinion) (rejecting analogy to Mosley); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J., discussing Mosley):
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 316-17 (1973) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.) (discussing Mosley); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 129 (1973) (rejecting analogy to Mosley).
I4 408 U.S. at 99.
165 Id. Earlier in the opinion the Court phrased the issue as "whether there is an

appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment."
Id. at 95.
166 100 S. Ct. at 2289.
167 Id. at 2290 (emphasis added).
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The Court in Carey appears to require a stricter degree of
scrutiny than it used in Mosley. A higher degree of scrutiny was
probably required to invalidate the statute in Mosley as opposed to
the statute in Carey because the Court found the classification in
Carey totally unrelated to the asserted rationale of protecting the
privacy of residential neighborhoods. Justice Brennan writing for
the majority stated that "nothing in the content-based labornonlabor distinction has any bearing whatsoever on privacy. Appellants can point to nothing inherent in the nature of peaceful
labor picketing that would make it any less disruptive of residential privacy than peaceful picketing on issues of broader social
concern." 6' The Court had little difficulty rejecting the second
objective asserted by the state, that of "providing special protection for labor protests." 169 It saw "the central difficulty" with
that objective as "presuppos[ing] that labor picketing is more deserving of First Amendment protections than are public protests
over other issues." 170 The Court implied, however, that labor
picketing was actually entitled to less protection because "[p]ublic
issue picketing ... has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values." 171
The Mosley opinion was described in Carey as based upon the
city's failure to show that picketing on nonlabor subjects was
" 'clearly more disruptive' than [labor picketing]." 172 The Court
appeared, however, to apply an even more stringent test in Mosley.
It strongly implied that in determining whether nonlabor picket-

Id. at 2293.
169 Id. at 2293-94.
170 Id. at 2293.
171 The Carey Court cited T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 444-49
(1970), for the proposition that "nonlabor picketing is more akin to pure expression than
labor picketing and thus should be subject to fewer restrictions." 100 S. Ct. at 2293. The
Court's statement in Consolidated that even viewpoint-neutral subject matter discrimination
must be strictly scrutinized, see 100 S. Ct. at 2333-34, is inconsistent with the assertion that
public issue speech is more deserving of protection than other subjects. This assertion has
been similarly utilized in other cases. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
The categorization approach, which places certain kinds of speech-e.g., obscentity
and libel-outside first amendment protection, also seems inconsistent with the assertion
that viewpoint-neutral subject matter discrimination requires the application of strict
scrutiny. See Karst, supra note 77, at 30-32. Compare the plurality opinion in Young v.
American Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (nonobscene sexually explicit expression
entitled to "lesser" first amendment protection) with the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, id. at 73 n.1, in the same case, rejecting this view.
172 100 S. Ct. at 2289 (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100
(1972)).
268
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ing is clearly more disruptive than labor picketing, the government simply cannot resort to generalizations:
Predictions about imminent disruption from picketing involve
judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not
by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter. Freedom of expression, and its intersection with the
guarantee of equal protection, would rest on a soft foundation
indeed if government could distinguish among picketers on
such a wholesale and categorical basis.1 73
The question that remains unanswered by Mosley, Carey and
the analyses of Professors Farber and Stone is how close a fit
there must be when an underinclusive classification burdens expression. Is it enough if the danger at which the statute is aimed
is significantly greater with respect to those burdened than those
excluded from the burden? If it could be shown that nonlabor
picketing was twice as likely to be disruptive, could it alone be
74
banned? The language of Mosley suggests that it could not.1
However, it appears that the Court in Mosley was influenced by
the overinclusiveness of the statute even though its holding was
seemingly based upon equal protection underinclusiveness. The
Court suggested that Chicago could have focused on the abuses
themselves, rather than upon subject matter, by simply banning

173408 U.S. at 100-01.
114 The language used by the Court in Mosley indicates that an actual showing that labor
picketing was less disruptive would have been fruitless. Indeed, the city argued rather
persuasively that labor picketing is more peaceful than other types of picketing: "As we all
know, student demonstrations at schools-and even such demonstrations by parents and
Iconcerned citizens'-are utterly different. Mass picketing, sit-ins, smashed windows have
been the order of the day. The very purpose of such demonstrations often is to bring the
educational process to a halt." Brief for petitioners at 29-30, Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In its reply brief, the city further stated:
The city council without doubt has some reason to conclude that labor picketing is now usually more orderly than "public issue" picketing. Employees
have a very palpable economic stake in their employer's business and their jobs
there. Labor picketing is usually directed by experienced professionals and
under the much more detailed guidelines laid down by the National Labor Relations Board, which is empowered to issue unfair practice charges against unions as well as employers. Labor picketing is now usually token picketing ....
The distinction between labor picketing and "public issue" picketing is reasonably related to the requirements of assuring orderly conditions for the conduct
of public education, certainly a legitimate state end.
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 7-8.
Professor Farber concludes that Mosley fit "neatly into [his] proposed approach
[because] the city presented no factual basis for believing that nonlabor picketing was mark-
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all disruptive picketing. 1'7 An alternative that would be neither
underinclusive nor overinclusive therefore was available. Furthermore, Mosley was not just a case involving a subject matter
restriction; the statutes in both Mosley and Carey favored the views
of labor,17 1 a preference that may well have reflected the political
clout of labor upon the legislature.
The fate of the federal restrictions if challenged on equal
protection grounds may well depend upon the level of scrutiny
employed. An intermediate level might be appropriate because
the burdens are underinclusive rather than overinclusive, and because the discrimination in the statute clearly was not caused by a
legislative bias in favor of those entities and subjects not burdened
by the restrictions. Nevertheless, the language of Mosley purporting to require a high degree of precision in avoiding underinclusive classifications clearly will create serious problems. If a compelling state interest for omitting certain entities and subjects is required, then the federal statute seems constitutionally flawed. On
the other hand, if the application of elevated scrutiny means that
there must be a plausible reason for excluding certain groups
from the reach of the burden and that the legislative motive must
edly more disruptive than labor picketing." Farber, supra note 106, at 760. Perhaps Professor Farber would require statistics or explicit examples of previous disruption. Several
years after Mosley, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Court
invalidated a statute banning the showing of films with nudity in drive-in theaters. The
Court found that the statute was overinclusive with respect to the state's interest in protecting minors, id. at 213, and underinclusive with respect to its interest in traffic safety. Id. at
215. The Court stated: "Appellee offers no justification, nor are we aware of any, for
distinguishing movies containing nudity from all other movies in regulations designed to
protect traffic. Absent such a justification, the order cannot be salvaged by this rationale."
Query what would the Court have done had evidence been presented that psychological
studies demonstrate that drivers are more distracted by nude movie scenes at drive-in
theaters than by other scenes?
7.5 Such excesses "can be controlled by narrowly drawn statutes," Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 562, focusing on the abuses and dealing evenhandedly with picketing regardless of
the subject matter. Chicago's ordinance imposes a selective restriction on expressive conduct far "greater than is essential to the furtherance of [a substantial governmental] interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Mosley, 40,8 U.S. at 102 (brackets
and emphasis in original).
This approach could create a vagueness problem. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1971), however, the following ordinance, survived a vagueness challenge:
[N]o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in
which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in
the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the
peace or good order of such school session or class thereof."
Id. at 107-08 (quoting ROCKFORD, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 28, § 18.1(i) (1969)).
176 Farber, supra note 106, at 735. Under Professor Stone's analysis, the restriction in
Mosley would be a narrow subject matter restriction subject to the same strict degree of
scrutiny applied to viewpoint restrictions. Stone, supra note 106, at 109 n.129. See text
accompanying notes 129-130 supra.

1980]

CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

985

not involve a preference for a particular group or point of view,
then the statute could be upheld.
The Massachusetts statute involved in Bellotti may not have
passed the test suggested above. Because both unions and corporations spend large sums to influence elections and both require protection of dissenting members and shareholders, there appears to
be little justification for excluding unions from the regulation.
The legislative history of the Massachusetts statute indicated that
the disparate treatment of corporations and unions was motivated
by a concern with the probable content of corporate expression. 77 Thus, the inclusion of corporations and exclusion of unions seems to have reflected a legislative preference for the views
of one group over another.
Neither the federal statute nor the invalidated Massachusetts
statute applied to partnerships or business trusts. Is there reason
for this exclusion? Business entities are profit motivated enterprises. They are likely to have substantial economic interests and,
consequently, may seek to exert undue influence.1 78 In addition,
there are minority investors who may disagree with the expression
of the majority. Historically, however, the political involvement of
these organizations on the federal level has been de minimis. 17 "
Requiring expression through PACs may discourage even the
minimal political expression in which they now engage. Thus,
there may be reason for excluding these entities from the federal
restrictions.
The next discrimination problem involves not discrimination
among persons or entities but discrimination on the basis of
subject-matter. Why should expression regarding the electoral
process be forced through voluntary committees, while other expression is left unencumbered? Why is a corporation free to speak
out on political questions not related to a particular candidate's
campaign or to lobby on issues before Congress? To the extent
that the concern with corruption is a basis for the statutory
scheme, expression directly related to a candidate's election poses
the most serious danger. It is here that the quid pro quo is most
likely. From the standpoint of the protection of dissenting
shareholders, it is this type of speech that presents the greatest
dilemma-primarily because it is so closely associated with the
fundamental right to vote. 180 Shareholders can vote for
177 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 793.
178

See text accompanying notes 201-05 infra.

171 See note 158 supra.

180 See text accompanying notes 259-65 infra.
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whomever they please, but a corporation can use their assets to
attempt to convince others to vote against their political preferences. The corporation may also, by its expression of financial
support, improperly induce a legislator to approve legislation of
which the shareholders may disapprove. A corporation's statement
on public policies unrelated to a political campaign does not affect
to the same extent a shareholder's representation or vote.
In Bellotti the Court was troubled by the fact that legislation prohibited electoral contributions and expenditures but left
lobbying unrestricted.' 8
Arguably, lobbying involves the similar
problem of utilizing dissenting shareholders' funds to procure
legislation disagreeable to them. Is there a reason for forcing contributions and expenditures in connection with an election
through a PAC when funds may be spent directly in lobbying efforts? Certainly both situations are connected to the dissenters'
right to representation. There are, however, important differences. First, legal lobbying involves supplying officeholders with
information supporting or opposing legislation; it does not involve
the election of specific individuals to public office. Thus, the
danger of undue influence presented by lobbying is slight. Obviously, this is not true of illegal lobbying, in the form of bribes. A
ban or restriction on lobbying generally, however, would have little effect upon that practice. Second, with all its faults, lobbying
plays a vital informational role in legislative descisionmaking;
therefore, the government's interest in having this information
must also be weighed in the balance.1 82 Forcing corporations and
unions to spend only voluntarily-collected funds for lobbying
might result in inadequate funding, because people are unaccustomed to contributing for such purposes and may not participate
as actively as they would in the electoral context. Recent history
demonstrates that the marketplace of ideas will not suffer by requiring that corporate and union electoral contributions and expenditures be made from PACs.' 8 3 There is insufficient experi181 See 435 U.S. at 792 n.31. The Court characterized this as paternalistic because it
implies that legislators are sophisticated enough to deal with the influence of lobbyists,
whereas voters are unable to evaluate the arguments of corporations made in connection
with elections.
182 "It is recognized that in the argument and counter arguments of the process as
a whole, pressure groups and lobby organizations sometimes provide considerable technical information and original research on legislation which helps give Congress and the
public a far clearer picture of problems and of the true meaning of certain proposals."

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, LEGISLATORS AND THE LOBBYISTS
182

See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.

1 (1965).
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ence, however, from which to judge the effect of such a restriction on lobbying funds. 1 8 4 Thus, there seem to be plausible
reasons for excluding funds spent for lobbying from the PAC requirement.
Because the federal restrictions on corporate and union contributions and expenditures burden the fundamental interest of
freedom of expression, it will be argued that elevated scrutiny
must be applied in an equal protection underinclusiveness challenge. In determining the applicable level of scrutiny, the Court
should consider the fact that a fundamental right is involved,
which may require that if there is a reason for excluding particular groups or subjects from a burden, they must be excluded;
otherwise, the prohibition on overinclusive burdens would come
into play. This is particularly important when first amendment
rights are involved. Requiring a compelling state interest to
exclude a particular group or subject from a burden upon speech
creates the possibility of unnecessarily interfering with expression
and unnecessarily restricting the marketplace of ideas. The result would be an insoluble dilemma between the admonitions that
a statute burdening speech cannot be too broad or too narrow.18 5
III
THE GOVERNMENT INTERESTS ALLEGEDLY SERVED BY THE FEDERAL
RESTRICTIONS UPON POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES

Whether the Court applies strict scrutiny, some intermediate
form of review, or even a mere rational basis test to the federal

restrictions, the government interests allegedly served by the restrictions will have to be examined. The following three subsec-

184 There is some experience with a requirement that funds used for lobbying must be
voluntarily provided. In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), the Court

suggested that a rebate to dissenters of union dues used for noncollective bargaining purposes would remedy the first amendment violations. Although the opinion is less than
explicit, its holding seems to apply to funds used for lobbying. Id. at 235. There is some
uncertainty, however, whether Abood is applicable to private sector unions. See note 241
infra. The requirement of an affirmative contribution to a PAC for lobbying would proba-

bly reduce the funds available for lobbying more so than a rebate remedy.
185 Justice Rhenquist made a similar point in his dissenting opinion in Carey . He asserted that the majority's holding, when considered with previous cases requiring that the

"least restrictive" means be used in laws regulating speech, had created a "Catch-22" because "the state is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't." 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2298
(1980). Rhenquist justified the exemption for labor picketing by relying on the state's argument that when a home is also a place of employment, the resident's "privacy interests
are reduced." Id. at 2301. The majority in Carey rejected this "waiver" argument, viewing
the preference for labor picketing as totally unrelated to the interest in privacy. Id. at 2294-95.
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tions examine the rationales of preventing corruption, equalizing
political influence and protecting the views of dissenting
shareholders and union members.
A. Preventing Corruption
In Buckley, the Court held that preventing the reality and appearance of corruption and undue influence is a compelling state
interest sufficient to validate federal limitations on political contributions. 18' Although the Court used the terms "corruption"
and "undue influence" interchangably without defining them,18 7 it
seemed to include more than the quid pro quo or prearranged
bribe:
Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure
requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with
"proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." But laws
making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only
the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to
influence governmental action.188
186 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1976).

187Corruption has been defined as "[ilnducement (as of a political official) by means of
improper consideration (as bribery) to commit a violation of duty." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 512 (1976).

The Court implied in Buckley that preventing the appearance of corruption, even when
no actual corruption was likely to occur, would establish a compelling government interest.
In upholding limits on political contributions, the Buckle), Court stated:
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is
the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of
the opportunity for abuses inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions .... Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of
the appearance of improper influence "is also critical ... if the confidence in
the representative system of Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent."
424 U.S. at 27 (quoting Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
Because the "appearance" of corruption will probably accompany a situation in which actual corruption is likely, the Court should not have to rely solely on thd appearance to
establish a compelling state interest. In Buckley, the Court responded to the argument that
"most large contributions do not seek improper influence," id. at 29, by asserting that "it is
difficult to isolate suspect contributions but, more importantly, Congress was justified in
concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires
that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated." Id. at 30.
The first case that utilized the "appearance of impropriety" rationale to restrict speech
upheld federal restrictions on the political activities of civil service employees. Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). Although first amendment rights were
involved, the Court did not use the language of strict scrutiny analysis in discussing the
standard of review. Both actual and apparent impropriety also were evident in this case as
they were in Buckley.
188424 U.S. at 27-28.
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A reasonable definition of undue influence or corruption
should include acts of an officeholder that are designed to attract
or repay a financial supporter. Additionally, even if the officeholder ultimately acts against the interests of a financial supporter,
undue influence arises if greater weight is given to the interests of the contributor than to the interests of other constit18 9
uents.
The most obvious weakness in the argument that the statute
is justified as a means of preventing corruption and undue influence is that it is overinclusive.1 90 Under the statute, a corporation cannot directly spend fifty cents to buy a political bumper
sticker even though such a small expenditure would generate no
corruption or undue influence. Because an expenditure for political expression is equivalent to speech protected by the first
amendment,I"" 1 the PAC requirement seems to be a clear example
of unconstitutional overbreadth. It is not necessary to prohibit a
corporation or union from contributing or expending funds except through a PAC in order to prevent corruption. Indeed, there
is seemingly no relation between the PAC requirement and the
goal of preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption and
92
undue influence.'
In addition to the overbreadth problem, the corruption
rationale presents other serious difficulties. The Buckley Court

18s See Nicholson, supra note 8, at 341.

"o See Redish, supra note 25, at 356-57. The statute may also be overbroad because it
might limit certain forms of nonpartisan expression that have no corrupting effect. The
statute specifically permits "nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a
corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their
families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members and their families." 2 U.S.C.
§ 442b(b)(2)(B) (1976). This limited exception may imply that other nonpartisan activities are
improper under the statute. The Commission, however, has promulgated a regulation that
permits profit corporations to engage in voter registration drives in conjunction with a
nonprofit, nonpartisan organization. See 11 C.F.R. § I14.4(d) (1980). Federal courts have
interpreted the Act to exclude nonpartisan expression. See Redish, supra note 25, at 348-49.
191 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
The appellate court in Buckley analogized the case before it to United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1969), which applied a less stringent standard of review to sustain a prosecution for draft card burning. The court argued that the expenditure of money, like burning a draft card, was not pure speech and thus did not deserve the most stringent standard
of protection. 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court rejected this argument: "[T]his Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the
expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or reduce the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment." 424 U.S. at 16.
12 See text accompanying note 205 infra.
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held that the goal of preventing corruption did not justify limiting
independent expenditures made on behalf of candidates 1.3 but
did justify limitations on contributions.1 94 Under the Buckley holding, the Court may sustain the restrictions on direct corporate and
union contributions under the undue influence and corruption
rationale, while invalidating the restrictions on independent corporate and union expenditures.19 5 Even assuming the validity of
Buckley's dubious distinction between contributions and expenditures, 190 there is a possibility that restrictions on independent corporate and union expenditures could still be limited or banned on
the ground that they have more potential for corruption than expenditures made by individuals and other groups. The Court appeared to reserve this question in Bellotti when it noted that "Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger
of real or apparent corruption in independent expenditures by
corporations to influence candidate elections." 197
As a starting point for developing a theory justifying a restriction on independent corporate and union expenditures, it is pro191 424 U.S. at 45-48.
194

Id. at 25-30.

195 See Birnbaum, supra note 64, at 172.
196 For a critique of this distinction see Nicholson, supra note 8, at 340-44; Rosenthal,

The Constitution and Campaign Finance Regulation after Buckley v. Valeo, 425 ANNALS 124,
130-31 (1976); Comment, supra note 8, at 873-74. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and White, in separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated
that they were unconvinced by this distinction. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 241-46
(Burger, C.J.), 259 (White, J.), 290 (Blackmun, J.). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun concluded that contribution limitations also were unconstitutional. Justice White,
on the other hand, concluded that limitations on both expenditures and contributions were
constitutional. Id. at 259.
197 435 U.S. 788 n.26. The Court found the corruption rationale irrelevant in Bellotti
because that case involved referenda questions that did not pose a danger of the corruption of public oficials. Id. The Court apparently intended to distinguish the case before it
from a case involving candidate elections, implying that corporate independent expenditures involved a greater danger of corruption than expenditures from noncorporate
sources. As authority for this proposition, the Court cited a student comment asserting that
a greater danger does exist in the corporate and union context. See Comment, The Regulation of Union Political Activity: Majority and Minority Rights and Remedies, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
386, 409-10 (1977). The student author's conclusion, however, is questionable. The comment cites only the "pernicious practices ... that surfaced in the 1972 presidential election," and the "questionable, if not illegal, contribution procedures used by many corporations," to support its broad conclusion. Id. at 409 n.131. The practices referred to by the
student author included laundering campaign funds, illegal use of corporate funds, undisclosed earmarking, innuendos of quid pro quos and accepting contributions from foreign
sources. The existence of such "pernicious practices" in 1972 would only be relevant if the
statutory scheme could be expected to reduce or prevent these practices. The corporate
restrictions were in place in 1972, however, and the increased use of corporate PACs that
has occurred in recent years seems to create more potential for pernicious practices. See
text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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fitable to analyze why the Buckley Court rejected the corruption
rationale as applied to independent expenditures. In Buckley, the
Court assumed that independent expenditures, unlike contributions, provide little or no "assistance" to the candidate and,
198
therefore, posed little danger of a quid pro quo arrangement.
The slight danger of corruption from such expenditures was outweighed by burdens it placed on the first amendment interests.t " " Assistance, however, is a relative term. If direct contributions are limited or banned, the only way a wealthy individual
or group can aid a candidate is with a large independent expenditure. It is naive to believe that candidates will not rely on
this source of assistance in the future and that it will not become a
breeding ground for undue influence. 20 0 This argument-not
considered in Buckley-takes on added importance in the context
of corporate and union expenditures because the potential for
corruption is greater with these large economic entities than with
individuals and other groups. Even if independent expenditures
generally create less potential for undue influence than contributions, this does not preclude a finding that independent expenditures by corporations and unions may create enough undue
influence to justify restrictions burdening first amendment interests. This*argument rests on the a~sumption, by no means
self-evident, that corporate and union expenditures are more corrupting than others. The underlying purpose for the existence of
corporations and unions may, however, justify this assumption.
The Federal Election Commission's amicus brief in Bellotti noted
that
198 424 U.S. at 47.
199 Id. at 47-48. The Court in Buckley also found a greater first amendment interest in

independent expenditures than in contributions. 424 U.S. at 19-23, 39. In addition, the
Court stated that the definition of independent expenditures created a vagueness problem
that could be resolved only by reading the restriction so narrowly that it would be very easy
to circumvent. Id. at 40-47. Both arguments could support the invalidation of the restrictions
on expenditures by corporations and unions. The statute may create other vagueness problems. See Redish, supra note 25 at 345-46.
200 See Nicholson, supra note 8, at 341-42.
"Independent" committees could be a major factor in the 1980 elections. By August,
1980, approximately $524,769 had already been spent on behalf of presidential candidate
Ronald Reagan by groups allegedly acting independently from his regular campaign committee. These groups plan to spend between 30 and 50 million dollars in their independent
efforts to boost his campaign. 7 CAMPAIGN PRhc. REP., July 7, 1980, at 2; N.Y. Times,
August 8, 1980, § A, at 15, col. 5. Other independent committees also have been very
active. For example, the National Conservative Political Action Committee has spent
$670,000 in its independent effort to defeat six liberal Democratic senators in the 1980
election. Id. Independent supporters of presidential candidate John Anderson also have
spent substantial amounts of money. Id.

992

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 945

[blusiness corporations are organized for the purposes of increasing financial gain and furthering the economic interests of
their stockholders; attempts to influence the political process
are primafaie for the purpose of furthering the financial return from their investments and the dangers of quid pro quo
arrangement between elected public officials and corporate contributors can be seen as even more compelling than the dangers
of the same0 1arrangement between such an official and a private
2

individual.

Unlike the corporation, which ordinarily is pursuing direct
economic rewards, the individual contributor may frequently choose
the recipient of his or her political bounty based on a broad spectrum of concerns which are unrelated to economic interests. 2
Thus, the development of quid pro quo and other forms of
undue influence is less likely.
Even if one assumes that corporations and unions are more
likely to have tangible economic interests more likely to result in
undue influence, this approach may take an overly narrow view of
corruption. An offer by a "fat cat" to make a huge expenditure
on behalf of a candidate if the candidate agrees to a particular
position, dear to the "fat cat" but not involving his or her
economic gain, involves corruption and quid pro quo. Indeed, the
effect upon the electorate may be greater if a candidate is convinced to change his or her views on war, peace, welfare reform
or health care than if a candidate agrees to drop an antitrust prosecution. Nevertheless, this should not undermine the general
proposition that political expenditures by corporations and unions
will much more frequently involve the possibility of a direct benefit received in return for the expenditure.
Arguably, the danger of corruption is greater merely because
of the vast resources available to corporations and unions. These
entities usually can outspend wealthy individuals, thus obtaining
more undue influence from sheer volume. Although this argument ignores the fact that there are many very wealthy individuals
who could match corporate or union expenditures, corporations

201 Amicus Brief of the Federal Election Comm'n at 19, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435

U.S. 765 (1978).
202 This argument is less applicable to unions because they frequently are interested not
only in issues that directly affect them economically but also in broader issues. There are
also many other organizations concerned primarily with one issue. Although the possibility
of a quid pro quo is just as great with these one issue organizations, they are not subject to
the federal restrictions unless they are incorporated.
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and unions would more often than not have greater assets to
draw upon for this purpose.
A narrow interpretation of Buckley is that the Court merely
rejected the limits upon independent expenditures because it determined that the danger of corruption was small compared to
the burden on first amenidment interests. The Court may conclude that the greater danger posed by corporate and union expenditures tips the balance towards finding a compelling interest
for restrictions upon these entities.
There are several very serious obstacles, however, to the
Court's acceptance of the foregoing arguments. First, the bans on
independent expenditures by corporations and unions are overbroad if their purpose is to prevent corruption. 0 3 Second, the
argument that corporations and unions pose a greater danger of
corruption than individuals and other organizations rests on a
question of degree. If the Court takes seriously its language in
Mosley, it may well conclude that the generalizations about propensities for undue influence necessary for this argument cannot
20 4
justify such a distinction.
An even more fundamental problem with the corruption
rationale is that it ignores the role of PACs. As long as the PAC is
allowed to make unlimited independent expenditures, corruption
will not be reduced. The possibility of quid pro quos and improper favors are virtually identical with or without the restrictions
because the same individuals manage both the corporation and
the PAC.2 °5 Thus, the restrictions cannot be upheld on the
rationale that they prevent corruption.

203 See text accompanying notes 139-45 supra.

204 See text accompanying notes 66-74 supra.
205 See note 37 supra. In the 1972 election, some public officials coerced corporate officers to make contributions. See Ervin, Campaign Practices and the Law: Watergate and Beyond,
23 EMORY L.J. 1,4 (1974) (citing the "rampant violations of federal election laws by the
solicitation of coerced contributions from corporations"); N.Y. Times, July 7, 1973, at I
(quoting George A. Spater: "Under existing laws, a large part of the money raised from
the business community for political purposes is given in fear of what would happen if it
were not given .... "). Many of these illegal contributions did not come from PACs. The
restrictions, therefore, did not wipe out this practice. It is arguable that the restrictions are
still useful, however, because they make it easier for a corporation to resist such threats.
On the other hand, corporate officers may respond to these threats by using PAC funds
for expenditures and contributions. The extent to which this will occur depends upon the
internal decisionmaking apparatus of the PACs. The more participants involved in PAC
allocation decisions, the less likely it is that public officials would attempt to use duress to
secure contributions or expenditures. Manipulation of several persons increases the danger
of disclosure and publicity.
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If preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is
the goal, the present scheme is ill suited for achieving it. A better
approach would be simply to place limitations upon corporate and
union contributions and independent expenditures regardless of
whether they are made directly or through a PAC. This would
avoid the over-breadth problem created by the ban on direct
contributions and expenditures. Because the Court upheld contribution limitations in Buckley, substituting the bans for limitations
on contributions should be constitutional. 20 6 If the Court is to
uphold expenditure limitations, however, it must accept the argument that corporate and union independent expenditures are
more "corrupting" than such expenditures by individuals and
groups. The Court might look more favorably upon such limits if
they are set at a level that would still allow the ideas of corporations and unions to enter the marketplace of ideas.20 7
B. Equalization Rationale
Proponents of campaign finance regulation argue that
equalizing political influence is a compelling governmental interest
sufficient to sustain restrictions upon large campaign contributions and expenditures. They claim that equalization of influence
promotes diversity in the marketplace of ideas, thus ultimately
advancing rather than hindering first amendment values.20 8
The equalization goal is also related to the equal protection
interest in the right to equal representation. 2 0 :1 In Buckley,
however, the Court flatly rejected these theories: "[T]he concept

206 The statute currently limits contributions from a PAC to an individual candidate to
$5,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (1976).
207 The majority pointed out in Buckley that the $1,000 independent expenditure limitation, which it held invalid, could not buy "a single one-quarter page advertisement. . . in
a major metropolitian newspaper." 424 U.S. at 40 (footnote omitted).
208 The appellate court's opinion in Buckley noted:
There is a positive offset to plaintiffs' invocation of the First Amendment in the
presentation by intervening defendants that the statute taken as a whole affirmatively enhances First Amendment values. By reducing in good measure disparity due to wealth, the Act tends to equalize both the relative ability of all
voters to affect electoral outcomes, and the opportunity of all interested citizens
to become candidates for elective federal office. This broadens the choice of
candidates and the opportunity to hear a variety of views.
519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Cf., Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign
Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 214, 225-29 (1972) (spending ceilings protect rights of hearers by allowing diverse points of view).
'09Nicholson, supra note 8, at 328-31.
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that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment .... 210 Therefore, if corporations have the same first amendment rights as individuals, there is
no compelling government interest in preventing speech by wealthy
corporations and unions from exerting excessive influence in the
marketplace of ideas. Such a purpose would be improper or, at
least, impermissibly served by restrictions on speech.2 1
In Bellotti, the state perhaps attempted to disguise the equalization rationale to avoid these implications from Buckley. Instead
of directly emphasizing inequality of influence, Massachusetts emphasized the voters' perceived reaction to inequality of influence.
The state argued that corporate "participation would exert an
undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote, and-in
the end-destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic
process and the integrity of government." 2 12 The Bellotti Court
virtually ignored this twist and reached the same conclusion it had
in Buckley, albeit with some equivocation. 2 1 3 Eschewing the
equalization rationale's paternalistic approach to the first amendment, the Court observed that "if there be any danger that the
people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced
by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the
First Amendment." 21 4 The Court also asserted that "the fact that
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent
no less than that which is unconvincing.' "213 Justice Powell, however, commented:
If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative
findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather
than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would
merit our ,consideration .... [B]ut there has been no showing
424 U.S. at 48-49.
The Buckley court did not clarify whether means other than restrictions on contributions and expenditures could be used to equalize the effect of large contributions on the
marketplace of ideas. Interestingly, the Court ignored the equalization rationale when it
reviewed subsidies for candidates, relying instead on the rationale of "eliminating the im210

211

proper influence of large pivate contributions." Id. at 96.
212 435 U.S. at 789.
213 See text accompanying note 216 infra.
214 435 U.S. at 792.
215 Id. at 790 (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689
(1959)).
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that the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming
or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts,
or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the
216
citizenry in government.

Justice Powell's equivocation is puzzling. It suggests that there
may be a discernable line between the improper goal of equalizing
political influence and the proper goal of preventing the electorate from being overwhelmed. Justice White in dissent suggested
that "[t]he Court's opinion appears to recognize at least the possibility that fear of corporate domination of the electoral process
would justify restrictions upon corporate expenditures and contributions in connection with referenda .... ,.217 Unlike the
majority, he found ample evidence of corporate domination in
Massachusetts based upon a similar unsuccessful 1972 referendum
in which opponents, financed largely by corporate treasuries,
spent $120,000 while proponents spent $7,000.218 On the other
hand, the majority commented that "[elven if viewed as material," 2 1 9 the fact that the referendum at issue was rejected in the
1976 election, without the aid of corporate contributions, 220 dem-

onstrated that there had been no corporate "dominance" of the
election. 2 ' It remains unclear whether evidence that a corporation dominated or overwhelmed the electoral process would convince the majority that corporate advocacy denigrated first
amendment interests. 222 It is also unclear what the Court really
means by the terms "dominate" and "overwhelm." If evidence
could be presented demonstrating gross inequality of expenditures, would that establish dominance?
216 Id. at 789-90 (footnote omitted).
217 Id. at 810.
218 Id. at 810-11. The majority opinion implies that Justice White's comparison is mis-

leading because "amounts of money expended independently of organized committees
need not be reported under Massachusetts law, and therefore remain[ed] unknown." Id. at
789-90 n.28. It seems likely, however, that such expenditures would reflect a similar proportion between corporate and noncorporate money.
219 Id.

at 790 n.28.

220 Corporate contributions were prohibited because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's decision upholding the statute (First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773,
359 N.E.2d 1262 (1977)) was then pending before the Supreme Court.
221 435 U.S. at 790 n.28.

222 The briefs offered very little statistical evidence about corporate involvement in political campaigns. Montana's amicus brief, however, referred to an unsuccessful 1976 California referendum that would have required legislative approval of cites for nuclear
generators. Supporters of the referendum, who received no corporate contributions, raised
only 68% of the amount raised by opponents of the referendum. Almost all of the opponents' funds came from corporate contributions. See Amicus Brief of Montana at 9, First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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In one of the few cases to consider the constitutionality of the
federal restrictions since Bellotti, 2 3 a federal district court upheld
the statute as "the least drastic means to achieve the congressional
goal of protecting the integrity of the political process." 22 4 The
need for this protection was based upon the "excesses of the corporate manipulation of the political process demonstrated in the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century ....

225

Certainly there is ample evidence of corporate domination of the
political process in candidate elections during the period preceding the enactment of federal corporate bans.226 If the Court,
however, were to uphold the federal legislation based upon such
evidence after having invalidated the Massachusetts bans, it could
create massive confusion regarding the validity of restrictions in
other states. Presumably, any state that could demonstrate a history
of corporate involvement similar to that experienced on the fed-

eral level prior to the enactment of the federal corporate bans in
1907 would be free to restrict corporate contributions.
As a practical matter, it is inconceivable that the Court would
approach this question on a state-by-state basis. The endless litigation and the fine distinctions that would have to be drawn between permissible persuasion and improper dominance are hardly
suited to a Supreme Court which purports to be concerned about
conserving judicial *resources227 and which dislikes meddling in the
details of legislative judgments. The more likely approach would
be for the Court to distinguish between ballot measure campaigns
and elections for public office. The evidence of domination on the
223 Several unreported cases since Bellotti have upheld various aspects of the federal restrictions. See note 29 supra.
224 Federal Election Comm'n v. weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). It is
unclear whether the Weinsten court relied on the corruption or the dominance rationale to
sustain the statute. The court's decision that the restrictions were overbroad supports the

conclusion that it was concerned with influence upon the electorate rather than with corruption of public officials. The court argued that "[tlo permit even small political contributions by corporations would alter the structure and presentation of political issues. Instead
of encouraging individual free speech, the allowance of corporate contributions would obscure it." Id. Yet the court also relied upon a footnote in Bellotti suggesting in dicta that

the federal restrictions may be a constitutional means of preventing corruption. Id. at 24748. There is a serious overbreadth issue, however, concerning both the corruption and
dominance rationale. See text accompanying notes 190-92 supra, note 230 infra.
225 Federal Election Comm'n v. Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. 243, 249 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
126 See, e.g., E. EPSTEIN, THE CORPORATION IN AMERICAN POLITIcs 24-29 (1969). The

Weinsten opinion cites S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 730
(1965), as support for this proposition. 462 F. Supp. at 249 n.7.
227 Chief Justice Burger has addressed this issue on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Burger, The State of the FederalJudiciary 1979, 65 A.B.A.J. 358 (1979); ChiefJustice Burger's
1977 Report to the American Bar Association, 63 A.B.A.J. 504 (1977).
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federal level prior to the enactment of the corporate and union
bans, and evidence of dominance in some state elections, 2 28 might
be sufficient to sustain restrictions in campaigns for public office
in state or federal elections. This would, of course, imply that the
Court could reconsider the constitutionality of such restrictions in
ballot measure campaigns if evidence of domination could be
produced.2 2 9
Even if the Court were to accept the dominance rationale,
there are serious difficulties with using it to uphold the federal
restrictions. The role of corporate and union PACs must again be
considered. The expression of a PAC is just as likely to dominate
the electoral process as the direct expression of unions and corporations. Therefore, the present federal statutory scheme does little
to prevent domination of the electoral process. Furthermore,
limitations, as opposed to absolute bans, may be a less restrictive
means of preventing dominance because it is unlikely that numerous small contributions by corporations and unions could dominate an election.230
The primary problem with the domination rationale for upholding bans or limitations is again one of line drawing. Can the
Court really distinguish between "effective persuasion" and
"domination"? Is not Congress, by attempting to prevent domination of the political process, restricting "the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others," which the Court in Buckley described as "wholly foreign to
the First Amendment"? 231 In Bellotti the Court rejected, as contrary to the first amendment, the "highly paternalistic" approach
of the Massachusetts statute. 2 32

Attempting to protect voters

from an imbalance of persuasion implies a lack of confidence in
their inherent ability to govern themselves, thus treating them like
children. At some point, however, corporate or union expression
may so dominate the electoral process that even an intelligent
voter could not consider all opinions and make a reasoned deci228 See EPSTEIN, supra note 226, at 24-26.

229 Dr. John Shockley has done extensive research 'on the effect of corporate influence
in ballot measure campaigns. His statistics reveal numerous instances in which the total
funds spent by corporate-backed groups far exceeded those spent by noncorporate groups.
Although it cannot be established conclusively that inequality or dominance was a causal
factor for the defeat or passage of a ballot measure, Shockley's evidence tends to show a
causal link. IRS Administration of Tax Laws Relating to Lobbing (Part 1): Hearings Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 256-73 (1978) (statement of John Shockley).
230 Overbreadth may also exist because the statute could be interpreted as restricting
nonpartisan expression that does not raise the domination problem. See note 190 supra.
231424 U.S. at 48-49.
232 435 U.S. at 791 n.31.
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sion. Perhaps it is not overly paternalistic for government to act to
prevent such an occurrence. However, the question remains
whether the Court would ever conclude that the line between effective persuasion and dominance had been crossed.
C. Protecting Dissenting Shareholders and Union Members
When a corporation or union spends funds for political purposes it is using the assets of shareholders or union members,
some of whom will ordinarily disagree with the political expression resulting from the expenditure. The federal restrictions have
been, at least in the past, aimed at protecting such dissenters from
having their funds used to support political causes with which
they do not agree. 2 33 This rationale probably fits the present
federal regulatory scheme better than any other. Perhaps the
Supreme Court could conclude that the combination of the
bans on direct corporate and union political spending and the authorization of PACs 2 34 may be the least restrictive means of dealing with the problem. Another possible solution is the use of
rebates to dissenters. 3 5 This alternative provides less protection,
however, because it requires dissenters to inform the organization's leadership of their opposition.2 36 In Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education,2 3 7 the Court held that a state statute forcing public
school teachers to pay the equivalent of union dues which would

233 See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948) (union restrictions).
234 As applied to nonprofit corporations, however, the statute may be overbroad, be-

cause no one need forego investment employment opportunities if they choose either to
leave the organization or remove their investment. Nonprofit corporations may not desire
to make political contributions or expenditures, however, because this would deprive them
of the tax advantages secured by their nonprofit status. *See I.R.C. § 501. The statute also
seems overbroad as applied to single shareholder corporations because of the lack of dissenting shareholders. The burden is more apparent than real, however, because the
shareholder could merely pay a dividend that could be paid for political purposes. See
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 142
supra.
235 See Comment, supra note 25, at 158-59.

2" The PAC requirement for corporations with few shareholders is the functional equivalent of a rebate procedure. The federal restrictions will not, therefore, reduce political
expression by these corporations more than a rebate procedure would. The only burden
imposed by the restrictions is the PAC reporting requirements codified in 2 U.S.C. § 434
(1976). In Buckley, the Court upheld other reporting requirements despite strong evidence
of a serious and unnecessary chill on expression by supporters of non-major party candidates. 424 U.S. at 66-74; see Nicholson, supra note 8, at 357-59. Justice White argued that
rebates were not an appropriate solution for corporate dissenters because "[t]here is no
apparent way of segregating one shareholder's ownership interest in a corporation from
another's." First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 818 (1978) (dissenting opinion).
23 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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be used for political expression rather than for collective bargaining violated the first amendment. 23 8 The Court noted that a rebate of the portion of the service charges used for political and
ideological purposes was an appropriate remedy. To obtain the
rebate teachers would need only to notify the union of their general opposition to the use of funds for nonbargaining purposes;
notice of opposition to specific expenditures was not necessary.
The Court explained: " To require greater specificity would confront an individual employee with the dilemma of relinquishing
either his right to withhold his support for ideological causes to
which he objects or his freedom to maintain his own beliefs with2 39
out public disclosure."
The rebate remedy requires an affirmative act by the dissenter making known his or her general opposition to the political
use of union funds. Conversely, the federal restrictions have been
interpreted as requiring an affirmative act expressing a desire to
donate to a PAC; passive acquiescence is insufficient. 240 The va-

238 Id. at 232-37. A similar issue was raised in International Ass'n of Mach. v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961), but the Court avoided the constitutional issue by interpreting the Railway
Labor Act to preclude the use of union dues for political activities without a remedy for
dissenting union members. Id. at 749-50. The Court further refined this remedy in Railway
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963), when it held that a general notice of opposition,
rather than notice of opposition about each expenditure, was sufficient. 373 U.S. at 129-31.
See discussion in Abood, 431 U.S. at 239 n.39.
Employees subject to the NLRA have been able to attack the use of funds by a union
that does not provide a rebate remedy under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), by alleging that the union breached its duty
of fair representation. See, e.g., Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126, 1130
(9th Cir. 1976). One court has rejected the assertion that the use of such funds without a
rebate violates the first amendment. Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408,
410-11 (10th Cir. 1971); see discussion in note 241 infra.
In Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843, 847-48 (1961) decided the same day as
Street, the Court affirmed a state court decision holding that compulsory enrollment in the
state's integrated bar did not violate an attorney's freedom of association. A majority of the
Court apparently did not reach the question whether a state may, consistent with the first
amendment, compel an attorney to contribute financial support to political activities of the
bar.
23 431 U.S. at 241.
240 Some labor PACs in the past automatically added contributions into the normal dues
that are withheld, forcing the individual to specifically request a rebate. A federal district
court has held that this "reverse checkoff" violated section 321(b)(3)(A) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(3)(A) (1976). The Court required the National Education Association to return all contributions collected by this withholding device
unless notified that the member wishes the funds to be used for a political donation. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07, 1112 (D.D.C.
1978). The district court stated that "'knowing free choice', means an act intentionally
taken and not the result of inaction when confronted with an obstacle." Id. at 1109 (quoting Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 439 (1972)).
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lidity of the federal restrictions on unions may turn on whether
this distinction has constitutional dimensions. After Abood, a union
member should not be able to successfully maintain that the
constitution requires unions to make political contributions and
expenditures only through PACs because the constitution appar241
ently only requires a rebate upon general notice of dissent.
241

The sufficiency of the rebate remedy is, however, unclear. The Abood Court declined

to rule on the constitutionality of an internal union remedy for refunding to the employee
that portion of his dues used for noncollective bargaining purposes. 431 U.S. at 240 n.41.
The definition of political expenditures is also unclear. In particular, it is uncertain
how to deal with expenditures that are neither political nor collective bargaining related. In
Beck v. Communications Workers of America, 468 F. Supp. 87, 89 n.3 (D. Md. 1979), the
court
reserved[d] for decision at a later date the question whether the Union may
spend the plaintiffs' fees for any or all of the noncollective bargaining purposes
complained of [e.g., union social functions]. [There does appear to be, in the
decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject, a gray area between expenditures for "political purposes" which are clearly impermissible and expenditures
for "collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,"
which are, of course, permissible.
Cf. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (union violated duty of fair
representation by spending dues for recreational, social and entertainment activities, death
benefit program, medical and legal insurance, union conventions, and publications).
The Abood holding would apply to private sector union shops if governmental action
is found. The court did not specify in Abood whether the state action in Abood was based
upon the existence of public employment or the authorization of an agency shop by state
statute. The Court has held that "governmental action" exists under the Railway Labor Act
(RLA) because it authorizes union shops and invalidates state right to work laws. Railway
Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1956). Arguably, the authoization of
union shops by section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1976), would also establish governmental action so that the use of union dues for
political purposes without a rebate to dissenters by organizations covered under either the
NLRA or the RLA would violate the first amendment.
This issue has not been conclusively settled. The First Circuit has held that governmental action does exist under § 8(a)(3) for asserting first amendment claims. Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16-17, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Cf. Buckley v.
AFTRA, 496 F.2d 305, 309-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974) (concluding,
without reaching governmental action question, that court had jurisdiction over first
amendment claims). The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, however, have noted that there is no
governmental action under § 8(a)(3). Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 433 F.2d 408,
409-11 (10th Cir. 1971) (dicta); Mendoza v. United Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 84
L.R.R.M. 2404 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); cf. Colorado Labor Council v. AFL-CIO, 349
F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Colo. 1972) (claims of governmental action against union under
Reid are "tenuous"), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 481 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1973).
The Reid court argued that Hanson could not apply to the NLRA because the latter statute,
unlike the RLA, allows states to prohibit union shops under 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976). 443
F.2d at 410. Thus, "[in NLRA matters, the federal government does not appear ... to
have so far insinuated itself into the decision of a union and employer to agree to a union
security clause so as to make that choice governmental action for purposes of the first and
fifth amendments." Id. at 410-11 (footnote omitted).
The constitutional claim is probably not necessary, however, because employees covered by the NLRA have been able to obtain a rebate remedy by allegeding a breach of the
duty of fair representation. See note 238 supra.
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Nevertheless, it does not follow that the Constitution forbids Congress from going one step further in protecting dissenting union
members by prohibiting the use of their dues for political purposes unless they choose to contribute to a PAC. Whether out of
fear of reprisal, peer pressure, or mere inertia, many dissenters
may be reluctant to express even general opposition to the political expenditures of the union. 4 2
Even if the federal restrictions are constitutionally applied to
unions, the question remains whether they are validly applied to
corporations. The constitutional argument used in Abood to protect dissenting union members who were required by state law to
pay union agency fees to keep their jobs is not applicable to corporations because of the lack of state action. 243 Justice White
pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Bellotti, however, that "the
Court [in Abood] did not purport to hold that all political or
ideological expenditures not constitutionally prohibited were constitutionally protected." 244 Although such protection for dissenting shareholders is not required, providing that protection
through PACs arguably then does not violate the first amendment
rights of the majority. The strong policy interest in allowing the
dissenter to "withhold ...support for ideological causes ...without public disclosures,"2 45 although not a constitutional right of
shareholders, may nevertheless constitute a compelling state interest.
Although protecting the rights of dissenting shareholders
may fit the present federal statutory scheme better than other
rationales, this approach is not free from difficulty. In United
States v. CIO, 246 decided in 1948, the Court described two congressional purposes for the federal restrictions: protecting dissenting
242 In Federal Election Comm'n v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C.

1978), the district court upheld the PAC requirement as applied to a noncompulsory labor
organization. The court was not clear whether the interests of dissenting union members
were protected constitutional rights. Dissenting members should not have been able to successfully assert that the involuntary use of dues paid to the organization constituted a constitutional violation because governmental action and compulsion were absent in that case.
In further support of the constitutionality of the statute, the court commented that
requiring "every dollar in [the] political action fund [be] knowingly and intentionally given"
advances the interest in preventing corruption, Id. at 1109. The court did not explain,
however, the connection between voluntariness and preventing corruption. See text accompanying note 192 supra.
24 See note 241 supra.
244 435 U.S. at 817; see note 242 supra.
24 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977).
246 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
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union members and corporate shareholders, and curbing the
political power of aggregated wealth.2 4 7 This duality was seemingly cast aside in Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 248 when the
Court discarded the second justification by holding that Congress
intended to ban only those union expenditures from the "general
union treasury-not the funds donated by union members of
their own free and knowing choice." 2 4 9 Pipefitters appeared to
shift the rationale almost totally to the protection of dissenting
union members. Three years later in Cort v. Ash,2 50 the Court addressed the same issue in the context of the corporate shareholder
but it reached a different result. One of several reasons the Court
gave for refusing to find an implied shareholder cause of action
for violations of the corporate restrictions was that "the intent to
protect corporate shareholders ... was at best a subsidiary pur2 51
pose" for the restrictions on corporate political expenditures.
Justice Brennan stated that "[w]hile a stockholder acquires his
stock voluntarily and is free to dispose of it, union membership

and the payment of union dues is often involuntary ....

252

If

the Court continues this distinction between corporate and union
dissenters, there is a real danger that it may upset the balance
struck by Congress between these two powerful interest groups by
invalidating only the corporate restrictions.
The distinction drawn in Cort was the precursor of dicta in
Bellotti indicating the Court's unwillingness to hold that this
rationale is a compelling government interest in the context of
corporations. As in Cort, the Court distinguished Abood by noting the lack of compulsion in the corporate context: "The shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and is free to
withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason." 2 5 3 The
247 Id. at 113. The Court's reference to curbing the power of aggregated wealth seems to
encompass the problems of both corruption and inequality of influence on the electorate.
248 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972).
249 Id. at 416.
220 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
251 Id. at 80.
252 Id. at 81 n.13.
253 435 U.S. at 794 n.34.

The Court stated:
A more relevant analogy ... is to the situation where an employee voluntarily
joins a union, or an individual voluntarily joins an association, and later finds
himself in disagreement with its stance on a political issue. The Street and Abood
Courts did not address the question whether, in such a situation, the union or
association must refund a portion of the dissenter's dues, or more drastically,
refrain from expressing the majority's views.
Id. at 794-95 n.34.
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Court also observed: "Appellee does not explain why the dissenting shareholder's wishes are entitled to such greater solicitude in
this context than in many others where equally important and
controversial corporate decisions are made by management or by
a predetermined percentage of the shareholders." 2 5

4

The

Court's disinclination to consider the interests of dissenting
shareholders to be compelling apparently rests on two bases. First,
it views shareholder investments as voluntary. Second, the Court
suggests that corporate political expression is indistinguishable
from other corporate actions with which shareholders may disagree. The following subsections examine these two explanations.
1. Voluntariness of ShareholderInvestments. justice White argued
in his dissenting opinion in Bellotti that "the State has a strong interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between
supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and
passing up investment opportunities." 23

There are two aspects

to the voluntary investment argument: the interest in promoting
increased societal welfare through the corporate structure and the
dilemma faced by the dissenting shareholder. justice White
explained:
[c]orporations ...are created by the State as a means of fur-

thering the public welfare. One of their functions is to determine, by their success in obtaining funds, the uses to which society's resources are to be put. A State may legitimately conclude
that corporations would not serve as economically efficient vehicles for such decisions if the investment preferences of the
public were significantly affected by their ideological or political
activities.2 5 6

The majority ignored the state's interest in regulating the
corporate structure for the benefit of society and focused only on
the interests of dissenting shareholders. The Court indicated in
dicta that it considered the shareholder's actions to be voluntary.
Such a conclusion seems basically inconsistent with the view that
there is compulsion in the union context. Although the prospect
of selling stock is usually less burdensome to a shareholder than
the loss of a job is to a union member, it cannot be denied that

2S4

Id. at 794 n.34.

255 Id. at 818. See Comment, supra note 25, at 157.
256 435 U.S. at 818-19 (dissenting opinion).
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both choices have economic costs. The investor presumably buys
or holds stock believing that it is the optimum use of those particular assets. An investor who would otherwise buy or sell a corporation's stock but refrains because of the corporation's political
activities has been forced to pay a price for his or her convictions.
It is irrelevant that the shareholder's or worker's alternative investment or job may be more optimal in the long run. The point
is that they are currently forced to balance their economic wellbeing against their political views. Furthermore, the alternative of
selling stock is impractical for many small investors whose shares
are held by pension funds, mutual funds or other institutional
2 57

investors.

Many individuals faced with the loss of a favorable investment
will choose to sacrifice their political ideals. Some will maintain
their investments simply out of the inertia that may compromise
even their most firmly-held convictions. Society does not benefit
when dissenters are misrepresented as favoring a policy or candidate they actually oppose. Society and the marketplace of ideas
are better served if a corporate contribution reflects the support
of those shareholders who have voluntarily joined a political action committee which chooses to support a candidate. The willingness of a contributor to give financial support either to a candidate or to a political committee with a particular point of view
accurately informs society of that contributor's political views. The
involuntary allocation of one's resources to a candidate or committee, on the other hand, merely misleads society.2 58
257 It is estimated that over 15% of all New York Stock Exchange securities are currently
held by pension funds and that 50% of American corporate equity capital may be held by
pension funds in 1985. PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS May 10, 1976, at 32, col. 3.
258 Another commentator suggested a similar scenario:
The group voice, by its very nature, tends to drown out the individual voice,
and to identify the dissenter, in the public eye, with the views of the group he
opposes. The minority member enjoys no benefit from the dispensation of is
funds by the organization; such expenditures serve only to decrease his income
and savings and to limit the activities, political and non-political, in which he is
economically capable'of engaging. As a result of governmental action, his position become unenviable, fraught with hardship, both moral and economic.
The public that listens to and is influenced by the group voice is, in many
ways, as poorly situated as the unwilling group member. First, the public is
deceived by the force and frequency of the sound that it hears. The will of
what may be a mere majority is expressed as the will of all. The public sees
unanimity of purpose, never dissension and discord. Secondly, the voices of
other associations competing with the forced membership group for public
favor and legislative bounty are diminished.
Comment, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 777, 789 (1962). But see E. EPSTEIN. CORPORATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGULATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 96-97 (1968).
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2. DistinguishingBetween Campaign Contributions or Expenditures
and Other Corporate Expenditures. The Bellotti Court saw no
distinction between the dissenting shareholders' interests concerning the corporation's political spending and other corporate decisions.2 5 9 The Court failed to perceive a key
distinction-that political expression is so closely related to the
rights to vote and to equal representation that it cannot be
equated with a purely economic corporate decision. David
Adamany has described the donation of large campaign contributions as "multiple voting" because the funds are used by candidates to influence the votes of others. "[B]y allocating some of
their resources to politics [contributors] have weight beyond their
votes in deciding elections and perhaps policy." 26 0 Because these
contributions do not involve state action, this multiplier effect
creates no constitutional problem. 26 1 Nevertheless, when a corporation's expenditure of dissenting shareholder assets is used to
multiply the votes of a candidate he or she does not support, the
interest in protecting the dissenter takes on an added dimension.
Of course, in some instances the additional funds spent may have
no impact on the election; thus, no multiple vote effect will occur.
Even in these instances, however, the large contribution may
create "multiple representation" because successful candidates are
much more attentive to the views of large contributors than to the
views of others.26 2 Through this form of undue influence, the
dissenting shareholder's assets may cause an officeholder to promote policies opposed by the dissenter.
The close connection between corporate political contributions and expenditures and the fundamental rights of voting and
representation readily distinguishes these expenditures from
others that dissenting shareholders may oppose. The Supreme
Court made a similar distinction concerning the interests of dis-

259

435 U.S. at 794 n.34. See text accompanying note 254 supra.

260 D. ADAMANY, FINANCING POLITICS 236 (1969).
261 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). Even if state action were present, the
Buckley Court appears to have eliminated the primary constitutional grounds for attacking
this form of multiple voting when it rejected the equalization of political influence as a
compelling state interest. See text accompanying notes 209-11 supra. Clearly the Court
would not view the prevention of this multiple vote effect as a constitutional right if this is
considered an improper purpose under the first amendment.
262 The degree of influence over public officials obtained by the large contributor probably ranges from increased access to the blatant purchase of favorable legislation. See
Nicholson, -supra note 8, at 820 .
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senters in Abood, when it upheld the constitutionality of an agency
shop statute to the extent that the funds collected by the union
were used for collective bargaining. Notwithstanding the burden
the statute placed on the first amemdment rights of employees
who disapproved of the union's collective bargaining activities,
the Court found sufficient interests justifying these burdens.2 63
Those interests, however, would not justify compulsory payments
used for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. 26 4 A
similar analysis is applicable to corporations. A corporation would
be unable to function economically if every business decision involving expression required a rebate to dissenting shareholders or
an expenditure from voluntarily collected funds.2 6 5 This does
not mean, however, that the interest in corporate efficiency must
override decisions concerning political expenditures and contributions.
D. The First Amendment Interests of Majority Shareholders
The analysis is not complete without consideration of the first
amendment rights of nondissenting union members and
shareholders. Individuals have the right not only to associate for
facilitating their expression but also to enhance that association by
pooling their resources.2 6 The requirement that funds collected
for political expression must come from voluntary sources seems
to be an ideal way of protecting those rights.2 6 7 In Buckley the
263 431 U.S. at 224-29. The Court found that the governmental interests promoted by
the Michigan statute were similar to those promoted by the federal statute-reinforcing
the union's status as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit
and preserving labor peace. Id. at 224-25.
264 Id. at 234-37. The Court found that political contributions did not promote the governmental interest in maintaining labor peace by preserving the union's status as the exclusive representative of employees.
265 For a discussion of the constitutionality of using union dues for lobbying, see note
184 supra.
268 The Court in Buckley invalidated restrictions on independent expenditures because
the restrictions "preclude[d] most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their
adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First Amendment protection of the
freedom of association." 424 U.S. at 22.
267 One critic asserts that the free rider phenomenon interferes with the associational
rights of the majority:
Although section 610 (18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (1976)) does allow union members to promote common political
interests by voluntarily contributing to a separate segregated fund, the Act
creates a free rider situation by preventing union members from spreading [the
cost of] campaign contributions among all members who benefit from [them]. A
union member may rationally decline to contribute even if he agrees that the
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Court refused to interfere with the individual's right to use his or
her resources to express support for a candidate through independent expenditures. But this is very different from protecting
an individual's right to use someone else's resources simply because that person has invested funds in a corporation or joined a
union. Freedom of association presupposes that the member of
the group voluntarily joined with others to amplify his or her
point of view. Thus, the federal statutory scheme sufficiently protects the first amendment interests of majority shareholders.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court will undoubtedly soon consider the constitutionality of the federal restrictions on corporate and labor organization contributions and expenditures. 2 8 The holdings and
dicta in Buckley, Bellotti, Mosley and Consolidated will create formidable first amendment and equal protection obstacles to the constitutionality of these restrictions. The fate of the restrictions is likely
to depend upon the degree of scrutiny that the Court applies in
both its first amendment and its equal protection analyses.
There is case authority that supports the application of less
than strict scrutiny to viewpoint-neutral subject matter burdens
such as the federal restrictions. Furthermore, the policies behind
the disfavor of content discrimination in first amendment analysis,
and the reasons for invalidation on equal protection grounds because of underinclusive classifications, have little applicability to
the federal restrictions. The Court's recent insistence upon first
amendment strict scrutiny review in Consolidated, however, will be
difficult to circumvent because the majority opinion unnecessarily
characterized the regulation as viewpoint-neutral. Additionally,
the Court's apparent refusal in Mosley to use generalizations to
support underinclusive speech classifications will be very troublesome in the equal protection analysis.
The government rationales commonly asserted in support of
the federal statute create other constitutional problems. The
election of a particular candidate is in his interest, because he may be convinced
that others will contribute in an amount sufficient to assure both the candidate's
election and appropriate behavior by the candidate once in office. This disincentive inhibits the ability of union members to associate in the expression of
their political preferences through financial support.
Comment, supra note 25, at 155 (footnotes omitted). This "disincentive," however, always
exists when persons voluntarily express themselves, especially through financial contributions.
28 For discussion of cases pending in the federal courts, see note 29 supra.
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equalization rationale does not appear to have survived Buckley
even though the related rationale of preventing domination of the
electoral process may still be viable. A related rationalepreventing corruption-was relied on in Buckley and used by
lower federal courts to uphold campaign finance regulations
against first amendment challenges. There is serious doubt, however, whether the present federal statute appreciably reduces
either corruption or domination. The rationale that best fits the
present statutory 'scheme is the protection of dissenting corporate
shareh6lders and union members. 26" The Court's dicta in Bellotti,
however, displayed extreme skepticism regarding the significance
of this interest in the corporate context.
Some of the arguments responding to the first amendment
challenges rest on the assumption that the restrictions have little
or no effect on the marketplace of ideas because corporations and
labor organizations are permitted to express themselves through
PACs. This assumption, however, also demonstrates the inadequacy of the statute from a policy standpoint. It would be naive to
contend that the vast sums of corporate and labor money poured
into congressional races through PACs does not result in undue
influence. The receipt by key legislators of contributions near the
$5,000 limitation, even if not outright bribes, can improperly influence the legislative process. 2 70 Furthermore, as each corporation is able to form its own PAC, an industry-wide policy bias can
result in the accumulation of very large sums for receptive legislators. 2 71 These problems could be ameliorated, and a stronger
case for constitutionality could be made, if Congress amends the
statute, focusing on the original goal of the restrictionspreventing undue influence.2 7 2 There is much that Congress can
still do within the constraints of Buckley, Bellotti, Mosley and Consolidated. Public funding of congressional campaigns is one possi-

269 This important interest, however, would be better served if Congress amended the
federal laws to insure that contributions to PACs are voluntary. See note 73 supra.
270 See COMMON CAUSE, How MONEY TALKS IN CONGRESS 1-23 (1978).
21" Because each international union may have only one PAC, the undue influence generated from an accumulation of union contributions may not be as great as that generated
by corporate contributions. See note 46 supra. Even though a union may be able to collect
as much or more than the combined funds collected by numerous corporations, the union
will be limited to a $5,000 contribution to any individual candidate. Numerous corporate
PACs, however, can each give $5,000 to an individual candidate whereas unions must contribute to several candidates, and, in some instances, this may prevent them from matching
business' influence upon key legislators such as committee members and chairpersons.
272 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 568-77 (1957).
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ble solution.2 7 3 Others include substantially lowering the present
$5,000 contribution limitation, and limiting the amount candidates
can receive from business and labor PACs. 2 74 These solutions,
however, will channel special interest funds into corruptiongenerating "independent expenditures." 2 75 Such reforms, therefore, should be accompanied by limitations on independent expenditures 2 76 set at a level that permits corporate and labor views
to enter the marketplace of ideas without creating an incentive for
corruption. A balance must be struck, albeit a precarious one, between the interests of hearers in having access to corporate and
labor views and the interest of the electorate in being governed by
representatives who are not indebted to special interests.

173 Although Presidential campaigns have been publicly-funded since 1974, I.R.C. §§
9001-9042 (amended 1976), Congress has rejected attempts to publicly fund congressional
races. See 6 CAMPAIGN PRAc. REP., May 28, 1979, at 1. However, a bill creating public
funding and limiting candidate spending, S. 832, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), has been
passed by both the Senate and House, and is currently pending in a conference committee.
See 125 CONG. REc. H9261-9306 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1979). The Court in Buckley upheld the
subsidy provisions of the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
even though some commentators viewed them as unconstitutional. See Fleishman, The 1974
Election Campaign Act Amendments: The Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 DuE L.J. 851,
862-97; Nicholson, supra note 8, at 348, 355, 359-72.
274 A bill was introduced in the 96th Congress that incorporates these reforms. H.R.
4970, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) would prohibit candidates for the House of Representatives from receiving more than $50,000 in contributions from all PACs during any two
year election cycle. Limitations on contributions from PACs would be reduced from $5,000
to $2,500. See 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1955-56 (1979). Because PACs have been a major
source of funding since the contribution limitations were enacted in 1974, the limitations in
this bill could lead to insufficient financing for some candidates. Incumbents and others
with name identification or personal wealth would ultimately benefit from intensified restrictions. Public funding may.then be a necessary adjunct to these stricter limits.
The constitutionality of these limitations on the amount a candidate can receive from
PACs may be challenged because it will effectively prevent some PACs from contributing
any amount to a candidate who has already received $50,000 in PAC contributions. The
burden on first amendment rights, however, should be outweighed by the interest in preventing undue influence.
215 See text accompanying notes 198-200 supra.
276 This conclusion is based upon the proposition that independent expenditures by
corporations and unions are more likely to cause undue influence than independent expenditures by others; thus, these limitations would be constitutional because they serve the
compelling state interest of preventing undue influence. See text accompanying notes
201-06 supra.

